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This paper presents a model of international portfolios with real exchange rate and non financial risks
that accounts for observed levels of equity home bias. A key feature is that investors can trade equities
as well as  domestic and foreign real bonds. Bonds matter: in equilibrium, investors structure their
bond portfolio to hedge real exchange rate risk since relative bond returns are strongly correlated with
real exchange rate movements. Equity home bias does not arise from the co-movements between relative
stock returns and real exchange rates, but from the hedging properties of stock returns against other
sources of risk, conditionally on bond returns.  We estimate the optimal equity and bond portfolios
implied by the model for G-7 countries and find strong empirical support for the theory. We are able
to account for a significant share of the equity home bias and obtain a currency exposure of bond portfolios
comparable to the data.
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The current international nancial landscape exhibits two critical features. First, the last
twenty years witnessed an unprecedented increase in cross-border nancial transactions.1
Second, despite this massive wave of nancial globalization, international portfolios remain
heavily tilted toward domestic assets. This is the well-known equity home bias (French and
Poterba (1991), Tesar and Werner (1995) and Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004)). As
of 2008, the share of US stocks in US investors' equity portfolios was 77.2%, despite the
fact that US equity markets account for only 32% of world market capitalization.2 The
importance of these two features has not gone unnoticed, and spurred renewed interest for
the theory of optimal international portfolio allocation.
Two important strands of literature aim to account for this observed equity home bias.
In both approaches, investors depart from the perfectly diversied portfolio of frictionless
general equilibrium models  a la Lucas (1982) in order to insulate their consumption stream
from additional sources of risk. Dierences in equilibrium portfolio holdings across countries
reect the equilibrium hedging properties of relative equity returns. Generically, consider
a risk-factor X that impacts negatively domestic investor's wealth relatively more than
foreigner's. Equilibrium dierences in equity holdings across countries will be proportional




where R denotes relative equity returns. Domestic equity bias arises when excess equity
returns are positively correlated with X. In that case domestic equities constitute a good
hedge against risk factor X.
The two strands of literature dier in the risk factor they consider. The rst one, launched
into orbit by the inuential contribution of Obstfeld and Rogo (2000), sets out to explore the
link between the allocation of consumption expenditures and portfolios in general equilibrium
models with stochastic endowments.3 One popular approach, initially developed by Baxter et
al. (1998) and extended by Coeurdacier (2009) and Obstfeld (2007), consists in characterizing
the constant equity portfolio that {locally{ reproduces an ecient market allocation through
trades in claims to domestic and foreign equities. In this class of models, investors face real
exchange rate risk and ecient risk-sharing requires them to hold dierent portfolios. The
hedging demand for equities is proportional to (1   1=)cov(lnQ;R)=var(R) where  is
the coecient of relative risk aversion and lnQ is the rate of change of the real exchange
1As a share of GDP of industrialized countries, gross foreign equity and direct investment positions have
been multiplied by more than four between 1983 and 2003. See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003).
2The equity home bias is a general phenomenon. See Coeurdacier and Rey (2011) for recent evidence.
The share of home equities in other G7 countries portfolios in 2008 are as follows: 80.2% in Canada, 73.5%
in Japan, 66% in France, 53% in Germany and 52% in Italy. All these countries account for less than 10%
of world market capitalization.
3A chronological but non-exhaustive list of contributions {some of which precedes Obstfeld and Rogo
(2000){ includes Dellas and Stockman (1989), Baxter, Jermann and King (1998), Kollmann (2006), Obstfeld
(2007), Heathcote and Perri (2007), Coeurdacier, Kollmann and Martin (2009), Collard, Dellas, Diba and
Stockman (2007), Coeurdacier (2009) and Benigno and Nistico (2011).
1rate (dened as the ratio of domestic to foreign price levels so that an increase represents an
appreciation).4
For a coecient of relative risk aversion  above unity, domestic equity bias arises when
excess equity returns (R > 0) are positively correlated with an appreciation of the domestic
real exchange rate (lnQ > 0). The reason is quite straightforward: with  > 1, ecient
risk sharing requires that domestic consumption expenditures increase as the domestic price
increases, i.e. as the real exchange rate appreciates. If domestic equity returns are high
precisely at that time, domestic equity provides the appropriate hedge against real exchange
rate risk, and domestic investors optimally tilt their portfolio towards domestic equity.
This line of research faces a serious challenge, as shown by van Wincoop and Warnock
(2010): for many countries, the empirical correlation between excess equity returns and the
real exchange rate is close to zero. This casts a serious doubt on the ability of this class of
models to account for observed levels of equity home bias.
The second important strand of literature focuses on non-nancial income risk Rn. In that
case, the hedge ratio takes the form  cov(Rn;R)=var(R). If returns on domestic equities
are high precisely when returns on non-nancial wealth are low, then investors will favor
domestic stocks. This line of research also faces an important empirical challenge as initially
shown by Baxter and Jermann (1997). These authors nd that nancial and non-nancial
returns appear to be positively correlated -as would be the case in a standard one-good
model-, suggesting that optimal portfolios should be biased towards foreign equity.5
This paper demonstrates that many of the results in this literature are not robust to the
introduction of domestic and foreign real bonds. We establish this point by solving jointly
for the optimal equity and bond portfolio in a generic environment with multiple sources of
risk.6 The key economic insight is that in most models of interest, as well as in the data,
relative bond returns (whether nominal or real) are strongly positively correlated with real
exchange rate uctuations. As a consequence, it is optimal for investors to use bond holdings
to hedge real exchange rate risks. In that sense, bonds matter! All that is left for equities
is to hedge the impact of any additional source of risk on investors' wealth. Of course, the
precise structure that these additional risk factors take matters for optimal portfolio holdings
but the general portfolio structure is very robust and quite independent of the details of the
model.
To establish these claims, we begin with a simple extension of Coeurdacier (2009) with
one additional risk factor, so that risk sharing remains -locally- ecient. We show that
this extended model can map many cases of interest studied in the literature: redistributive
4See Kouri and Macedo (1978), Krugman (1981) and the references in Adler and Dumas (1983) for an
early derivation of this result under partial equilibrium.
5Other papers found more mixed results. See Bottazzi, Pesenti and van Wincoop (1996) and Julliard
(2003).
6As we will see, bonds are redundant in the earlier models since risk-sharing is locally ecient with equities
only. This creates an obvious and uninteresting indeterminacy which is lifted once additional sources of risk
are introduced. That the economic environment is subject to more than one source of uncertainty strikes us
as eminently realistic.
2shocks, scal shocks, investment shocks, preference shocks, nominal shocks, etc.... Under the
assumption (veried in the data) that bonds take care of the hedging of the real exchange
rate, this simple extension delivers two important results. First, equilibrium equity holdings
take a very simple form, that does not depend on the equilibrium correlation between equity
returns and the real exchange rate. Second, the optimal equity portfolio does not depend
upon the preferences of the representative household. Equivalently, optimal equity positions
coincide with the equity positions of a log-investor who doesn't care about hedging the real
exchange rate risk.
This result has important empirical implications. First, since equity positions are not
driven by real exchange rate risk, equity home bias can only arise from hedging demands
other than the real exchange rate. This simultaneously validates van Wincoop and Warnock
(2010)'s result and establishes its limits. Equity home bias emerges in equilibrium if the
correlation between the return on non-nancial wealth and the return on equity is nega-
tive, conditional on bond returns, a generalization of both Baxter and Jermann (1997) and
Heathcote and Perri (2007).7 In recent and independent work, Engel and Matsumoto (2009)
developed similar results in a specic model with nominal rigidities.
The model also provides tight predictions about equilibrium bond holdings. The equi-
librium bond position reects the balance of two eects: an optimal hedge for real exchange
rate risk (for non-log investors), as well as a hedge for the implicit real exchange rate ex-
posure arising from equilibrium equity holdings and non-nancial wealth. In other words,
investors want to hold domestic real bonds since these bonds have higher returns in states of
the world where the price of domestic consumption increases (real exchange rate hedging).
However, if equity returns and non-nancial wealth are also higher in those states, investors
optimally undo this implicit exposure by shorting the domestic currency bond. For plausible
parameter values, these two eects will tend to generate small currency exposure of bond
portfolios and it is possible for a country to have short or long domestic currency positions.
Next, we show how equilibrium portfolios can be constructed from observable data on
bond returns, real exchange rates and the (unobservable) returns to nancial and non-
nancial wealth. Simple regressions of real exchange rate uctuations and the return on
non-nancial wealth on bond and nancial returns are sucient to back out equilibrium
portfolios from the data. This makes an important link between recent theoretical work on
international portfolios and data on asset returns. Importantly, this remains true in presence
of multiple sources of risk. In that case, markets become incomplete (even locally). Yet,
the theoretical portfolios can be constructed using the exact same empirical methodology.
This is reassuring since it indicates that our empirical results do not depend on the assumed
degree of completeness of nancial markets. The intuition for this result is the following: the
market structure inuences the mapping between risk factors and equilibrium asset returns.
Conditional on this mapping, however, equilibrium portfolios can always be recovered from
estimated hedging factors.
We confront our theory to the data. We use quarterly data on market returns as well as
7See also Bottazzi et al. (1996).
3non-nancial and nancial income for the G-7 countries since 1970 to ask wether data on as-
set prices are theoretically consistent with observed portfolios. Since returns on non-nancial
and nancial wealth are not directly observed, we follow Campbell (1996) and Lustig and
Nieuwerburgh (2008) and construct alternate measure of these returns. For all countries,
and across most specications, we nd that the presence of bonds is key to obtaining more
reasonable asset positions. Without bond trading, `the international diversication puzzle is
worse than you think' as Baxter and Jermann (1997) argued. In other words, the uncondi-
tional correlation between nancial and non-nancial returns is positive. However, once we
allow for bond holdings, we nd, as in the data, signicant levels of equity home bias for all
G-7 countries. Put dierently, nancial and non-nancial returns are signicantly negatively
correlated, once investors are able to control their real exchange rate exposure with bonds.
Regarding predicted bond positions, our empirical estimation predicts short but fairly small
domestic currency positions for a reasonable degree of relative risk aversion. This is in line
with recent empirical evidence on the (average) currency exposure of international portfolios
for G-7 countries.8
Section 2 follows Coeurdacier (2009) and develops the basic model with equities only.
Section 3 constitutes the theoretical core of the paper. It introduces bonds and an additional
source of risk, then characterizes the ecient equity and bond positions under dierent risk
structures. The model is then extended to the case of incomplete markets. Section 4 presents
our empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Benchmark Model.
2.1 Goods and preferences.
Consider a two-period (t = 0;1) endowment economy similar to Coeurdacier (2009). There
are two symmetric countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F), each with a representative house-
hold. Each country produces one tradable good. Agents consume both goods with a pref-
erence towards the local good. In period t = 0; no output is produced and no consumption
takes place, but agents trade nancial claims (stocks and bonds). In period t = 1, country i
receives an exogenous endowment yi of good i. Countries are symmetric and we normalize
E0(yi) = 1 for both countries, where E0 is the conditional expectation operator, given date
t = 0 information. Once stochastic endowments are realized in period 1, households consume
using the revenues from their portfolio chosen in period 0 and their endowment received in
period 1.
Country i0s representative household has standard CRRA preferences, with a coecient
8On average over the period 2000-2004, G-7 countries hold short (but small) domestic currency debt
positions with some heterogeneity across countries: the US, UK Italy and Japan, are short in their own
currency debt, while Canada, Germany and France long but with smaller currency exposures than US, UK
or Japan. See Lane and Shambaugh (2010a).





















where cij is country i's consumption of the good from country j at date 1.  is the
elasticity of substitution between the two goods and 1  a  1=2 captures preference for the
home good (mirror-symmetric preferences).










where pi denotes the price of country i0s good in terms of an arbitrary numeraire.
Resource constraints are given by:
cii + cji = yi: (4)
q denotes Home's terms of trade, i.e. the relative price of the Home tradable good in





so that an increase in q represents an improvement in Home's terms of trade.
2.2 Financial markets.
Trade in stocks and bonds occurs in period 0. In each country there is one Lucas tree. A
share  of the endowment in country i is distributed to stockholders as dividend (nancial
income), while a share (1 ) is instead distributed to households of country i (non-nancial
income): At the simplest level, one can think of the share 1  as representing `labor income',
but more generally, it captures the share of output that cannot be capitalized into nancial
claims.9 In our symmetric setting,  is common to both countries. The supply of each type
of share is normalized at unity.
Agents can also trade Home and Foreign bonds. Our benchmark model assumes risk-
free real bonds for the sake of simplicity. The important economic feature of these bonds
for our results is the high correlation between relative bond returns and the real exchange
rate, a feature shared by both nominal and real bonds.10 Each bond is denominated in the
9This could be due to domestic nancial frictions, capital income taxation or poor enforcement of property
rights.
10This results from the well-known fact that most real exchange rate uctuations are driven by the nominal
5composite good of each country: buying one unit of the Home (Foreign) riskfree bond in
period 0 yields one unit of the Home composite (Foreign) good at t = 1. Both bonds are in
zero net supply.
Initially, each household fully owns the local stock, and has zero initial foreign assets.
Country i household thus faces the following budget constraint at t = 0:
pSSii + pSSij + pbbii + pbbij = pS;
where Sij denotes the number of shares of stock j held by country i at the end of period 0,
and bij represents country i0s holdings of j0s riskfree bond. By symmetry, pS is the share
price of both stocks, while pb is the price of the both countries real bond.
Market clearing in asset markets for stocks and bonds requires:
Sii + Sji = 1; bii + bji = 0:
Symmetry of preferences and distributions of shocks also implies that equilibrium portfo-
lios are symmetric and can be summarized by domestic holding of local equity: S  SHH =
SFF and domestic holdings of the local bond b  bHH = bFF. The vector (S;b) fully de-
scribes international portfolios. S > 1
2 means that there is equity home bias on stocks, while
b < 0 means that a country issues bonds denominated in its local composite good, and
simultaneously invests in foreign bonds.
2.3 Characterization of world equilibrium.
We characterize rst the equilibrium with locally complete markets. We say that markets
are locally complete when the Backus and Smith (1993) international risk sharing condition
holds as a rst-order approximation. This will be the case as long as the set of (independent)
assets returns spans the space shocks, a condition satised in our model.11
2.3.1 Budget constraints.
Recall that household i holds S shares of the local stock with dividend piyi; 1 S shares of
the foreign stock, with dividend pjyj, b bonds denominated in the local good, with payment
Pi and  b bonds in the foreign good, with payment Pj. The period 1 budget constraints are
thus:
PiCi = Spiyi + (1   S)pjyj + Pib   Pjb + (1   )piyi (5)
where the last term represents non-nancial income.
Taking the dierence between Home and Foreign implies:
PHCH   PFCF = [ (2S   1) + (1   )](pHyH   pFyF) + 2b(PH   PF) (6)
exchange rate.
11See appendix A.1 for a precise statement of the associated rank and spanning conditions.
6which trivially states that the dierence in countries' consumption expenditures reects the
dierence in their incomes.
2.3.2 Goods market equilibrium
After the realization of uncertainty in period 1, the representative consumer in country i
maximizes C
1 
i =(1   ) subject to the period budget constraint (5) where PiCi = picii +
pjcij.






























: Without home bias in preferences (a = 1=2),
this simplies to
yH
yF = q : terms-of-trade are simply negatively related to relative supply
(with a constant elasticity 1=) and thus independently on the portfolio allocation. As
emphasized by Obstfeld (2007), the term 
a(:) captures the Keynesian transfer eects due
to consumption home-bias: with a > 0:5; a reallocation of wealth towards the home country
requires an improvement in the domestic terms of trade.
2.3.3 Log-linearization of the model and locally complete markets.
Denote y  yH=yF the relative output. We log-linearize the model around the symmetric
mean where y equal unity, and use Jonesian hats (^ x  log(x= x)) to denote the log-deviation
of a variable x from its mean value  x. Dene the Home country real exchange rate as the
foreign price of the domestic good, Q  PH=PF; so that an increase in the real exchange




= (2a   1)^ q: (8)
so that in this model, the real exchange rate always appreciates when the terms of trade
improve.
As shown in appendix A.1, if a rank and spanning conditions are satised, markets are
locally complete, that is, the competitive equilibrium replicates the ecient risk-sharing allo-
cation up-to the rst order.12 This property turns out to simplify the portfolio problem: one
just needs to nd the portfolio that replicates locally the ecient allocation. In particular,
the ratio of Home to Foreign marginal utilities of aggregate consumption is linked to the
consumption-based real exchange rate by the familiar Backus and Smith (1993) condition
12The spanning condition states that the dimensionality of the shocks is smaller than the number of
independent available assets. The rank condition states that shock innovations do not leave asset pay-o
unaected.
7(in log-linearized terms):13
  ( ^ CH   ^ CF) =
^ PH
PF
= (2a   1) ^ q: (9)
Ecient risk sharing requires that relative consumption declines with an elasticity 1=
when the real exchange rate appreciates. Log-linearizing equation (7) then substituting (9)
and (8) gives:
^ y =  ^ q (10)
where   
 
1   (2a   1)
2
+(2a   1)
2 = > 0 represents the equilibrium terms of trade
elasticity of relative output. A relative increase in the supply of the home good (^ y > 0) is
always associated with a worsening of the terms of trade (^ q < 0) with an elasticity  1=.
Without home bias in preferences (a = 1=2),  = ; the elasticity of substitution between
Home and Foreign goods. When a > 1=2; there are deviations from purchasing power
parity. An increase in relative output triggers a fall in the relative price level. Under locally
complete markets, this requires an increase in domestic consumption expenditures (at a rate
1=), increasing relative demand for the home good.14
If we denote (log) relative returns ^ Rf for nancial income, ^ Rb for bond returns and ^ Rn
for non-nancial income, we get from from (10):
^ R
f = ^ q + ^ y = (1   )^ q;
^ R
b = ^ Q = (2a   1) ^ q; (11)
^ R
n = ^ q + ^ y = (1   )^ q:
When  < 1; an increase in Home relative output is associated with a decrease in Home
nancial (equity) and non-nancial returns (relative to Foreign). This happens when either
the elasticity of substitution between goods is low ( < 1) or the preference for the home
good is suciently strong.15 Note also that in that case, relative bond returns, relative
nancial and non-nancial returns are all perfectly positively correlated.
Next, log-linearize equation (6) using (9) and (11) to obtain:






(2a   1) ^ q (12)
= [ (2S   1) + (1   )](1   )^ q + 2b(2a   1) ^ q:
The rst equality is simply a restatement of the Backus-Smith condition in terms of
relative consumption expenditures ^ PC. With locally complete markets, a shock that leads
to an appreciation of the real exchange rate ((2a   1) ^ q > 0) induces an increase in relative
consumption expenditures when   1. The expression on the second line of equation (12)












is constant. Under locally complete markets, the same condition holds at the rst-order.
14See Obstfeld (2007).





8shows the change in relative income necessary to implement the ecient allocation of relative
consumption expenditures.
2.4 Optimal Equity Portfolios.
Financial markets are locally complete when there exists a portfolio (S;b) such that equations
(10) and (12) both hold for arbitrary realizations of the relative shocks ^ y. Since equity and
bonds returns are perfectly correlated, portfolios are indetermined: there are innitely many
combinations (S;b) that implement the locally ecient allocation. Consequently, we can
ignore bonds and focus on the case where ecient risk sharing is implemented with equities
only, as done in earlier literature.














 (1   )
#
(13)
When  = 1; this expression coincides with the equilibrium equity position of Coeurdacier
(2009) and Obstfeld (2007). In the more general case where   1; the optimal equity
portfolio has two components. The rst term inside the brackets represents the equity
position of a log-investor ( = 1). As in Baxter and Jermann (1997), the domestic investor
is already endowed with an implicit equity position equal to (1   )= through her exposure
to non-nancial income (1   )y. Osetting this implicit equity holding and diversifying
optimally requires an equity position S = (2   1)=2 < 1=2 for  < 1: As is well known
since Baxter and Jermann (1997), this component of the optimal portfolio imparts a foreign
equity bias.
The second component of the optimal equity portfolio represents a hedge against real
exchange rate uctuations. It only applies when  6= 1; i.e. when total consumption ex-
penditures uctuate with the real exchange rate. Looking more closely at the structure
of this hedging component calls for a number of observations. First, it is a complex and
non-linear function of the structure of preferences summarized by the parameters ;  and
a: As Obstfeld (2007) and Coeurdacier (2009) note, for reasonable parameter values, this
hedging demand can contribute to home equity bias only when  < 1; i.e. when the terms
of trade impact of relative supply shocks is large.16 Using equations (11) and (8), this hedge















As in the early partial equilibrium literature the optimal hedge component is simply a
16When  = 1; this component is indeterminate since the relative return on equities is independent of the
real exchange rate (and constant). This case is similar to Cole and Obstfeld (1991): perfect risk sharing
is achieved through movements in the terms of trade and equity returns in both countries are perfectly
correlated.
9function of the covariance-variance ratio between excess equity returns and the real exchange
rate.17
This model faces three main problems. First, the non-linearity in (13) implies that small
changes in preferences can have a large impact on the hedging demand. This is most apparent
if we consider the optimal portfolio in the neighborhood of  = 1: As gure 1 makes clear,
small and reasonable changes in ;  or a have a large and disproportionate impact on
optimal portfolio holdings, from large foreign bias (S  0) to unrealistically high domestic
bias (S  1). To the extent that researchers don't know precisely what is the correct value of
these parameters, the model does not provide enough guidance to pin down equity portfolios,
and a-fortiori, to explain the home portfolio bias. As emphasized by Obstfeld (2007), and as
gure 1 shows, things are even worse since the benchmark model cannot deliver home equity
holdings between S = 1 1=2 < 0:5 and S = 1; thus excluding the relevant empirical range.
Second, given the constant income sharing rule , the model predicts a perfect correlation
between nancial returns ^ Rf and non-nancial returns ^ Rn. This tilts portfolios towards
foreign equities, the rst term in (13), as emphasized by Baxter and Jermann (1997). While
this correlation might be positive, many papers found it pretty low.18
Third, the extent to which the model delivers equity home bias depends on the hedging
properties of equities for real exchange risk, as captured by the covariance-variance ratio
cov







: In the case of the United States, van Wincoop and Warnock (2010)
show that relative equity returns are poorly correlated with the real exchange rate. They
nd a covariance-variance ratio cov







equal to 0:32.19 With such a low
covariance-variance ratio, the model can deliver equity home bias (S > 1=2) only if the share
of nancial income in total income  exceeds 1   cov







= 68 percent, a
number vastly in excess of any reasonable estimate.
3 Equity and Bond Equilibrium Portfolios
This section turns the basic model of section 2 into a theory of bond and equity holdings by
introducing additional sources of risk. Section 3.1 adds exactly one source of risk. That case
is particularly tractable since markets remain locally complete. Unlike the previous section,
bonds and equities are now imperfect substitutes and the equilibrium portfolio holdings
of both types of assets are well dened. Section 3.2 shows that this additional source of
uncertainty can take many forms that map into a variety of models of interest. A general
nding is that equities and bond holdings depend on their general relative hedging properties
against both real exchange rate risk and the additional risk factor. Section 3.3 covers the
general case with multiple additional risk factors. In that case, markets are incomplete even
locally, yet we nd that our portfolio characterization remains unchanged and all our results
17See Kouri and Macedo (1978), Krugman (1981) and Adler and Dumas (1983).
18See Fama and Schwert (1977), Bottazzi et al. (1996), Julliard (2003) and Lustig and Nieuwerburgh
(2008).
19Once controlling for forward markets, their estimated covariance-variance ratio falls to 0.005.
10go through.
3.1 Equity and Bond Equilibrium Portfolios with Locally-Complete
Markets.
Assume that a shock "i aects country i in period t = 1, assumed i.i.d. across countries.
Denote " = "H="F the relative shock and assume that E0(") = 1 and ^ "  ln" is not perfectly
correlated with ^ y so that it represents a genuine source of additional risk. To characterize
optimal portfolio, we only need to specify how ^ " impacts nancial returns ^ Rf, bond returns




^ Rf = (1    )^ q + f^ "
^ Rb = (2a   1)^ q + b^ "
^ Rn = (1    )^ q + n^ "
: (14)
where   > 0 is possibly model dependent. The parameters k can be positive or negative.
They represent the impact of ^ " on nancial (equity) returns, bond returns and non-nancial
returns. Dierent models will have dierent implications on what k and   should be and
will be explored in more details in subsection 3.2. For the time being, the only restriction
we impose on the model is f 6= 0; that is, the new shock aects nancial returns.
Under the assumption that markets remain locally-complete, the budget constraint (12)




)(2a   1)^ q =  (2S   1) ^ Rf + (1   ) ^ R
n + 2b ^ R
b: (15)
Inspecting equation (15), there is a unique portfolio (S;b) such that it is satised for
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This portfolio ensures that markets are indeed locally-complete. While expression (16)
may look forbidding, it can be reinterpreted in terms of simple factor loadings.
To start with, let's rewrite the equilibrium bond and equity portfolios in terms of the
equilibrium asset loadings on the real exchange rate ^ Q = (2a   1) ^ q and the return to non-
20This requires that (2a   1)e 6= b
 
1    

. This condition makes sure that our rank condition is
satised, i.e. equity and bond excess returns are not collinear. See appendix A.1.
11nancial wealth ^ Rn: To do this, let's rst manipulate equations (14) to eliminate ^ " :
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 n;b ^ R
b + n;f ^ R
f:
where   =

(2a   1)  
 
1    

b=f
 1 : The coecients i;j capture the loading of asset
return j on factor i: They have the interpretation of covariance-variance ratios since they








^ Rij ^ Rj
 ; Q;i =
cov





^ Rij ^ Rj
 ;
where i 6= j 2 ff;bg: Importantly, each loading is conditional on the other asset return.
Since these loadings are expressed in terms of observables, they have an intuitive empirical
counterpart, and can be readily estimated from a multivariate regression, independently of
the specics of the model and of the source of the shock ^ ": This formulation will motivate
our empirical analysis in section 4.





























Consider the equilibrium bond portfolio b in the rst line of equation (19). It contains






Q;b captures the hedging of real exchange rate risk.
When  > 1, the household's relative consumption expenditures increase when the real ex-
change rate appreciates. If domestic bonds deliver a high return precisely when the currency
appreciates, then domestic bonds constitute a good hedge against real exchange rate risk.
The second term  1
2 (1   )n;b captures the hedging of non-nancial income risk. When
domestic bonds and the return to nonnancial wealth conditionally on the equity return
are positively correlated (n;b > 0), investors want to short the domestic bond to hedge the
implicit exposure from their non-nancial income. Equation (19) indicates that investors
will go long or short in their domestic bond holdings depending on the relative strength of
these two eects.
Let's now turn to the equilibrium equity position S in the bottom line of (19). The rst
term inside the brackets represents the symmetric risk-sharing equilibrium of Lucas (1982):




 Q;f; represents the hedging demand for domestic equity that arises
from the correlation between equity returns and the real exchange rate, conditional on the
bond returns . If this correlation is positive, domestic equities represent a good hedge against
movements in real exchange rates. The last term,  1 
 n;f; determines how equity portfolios
are aected when non-nancial wealth and nancial wealth are conditionally correlated. In
the case of Baxter and Jermann (1997) with Q;f = 0 and n;f = 1, the equilibrium equity
position becomes S = (2   1)=2 < 1=2: This term makes clear that equity home bias can
arise if n;f < 0: Importantly, what matters is the covariance-variance ratio between the
returns to non-nancial wealth and to nancial wealth conditional on the bond returns ^ Rb.
To our knowledge, this condition has not yet been empirically investigated in the literature.21
To summarize, the model indicates that equity home bias can arise even if equities are
a poor hedge for exchange rate risk, as long as non-nancial wealth and equity returns are
negatively conditionally correlated: n;f < 0: The model can also generate short positions
in domestic bond market when (1   1=)Q;b < (1   )n;b:
We know from van Wincoop and Warnock (2010) that Q;f is empirically small. In fact,
these authors show that the covariance-variance ratio is very close to zero precisely after
conditioning on the excess bond returns, or equivalently on forward rates. That is, Q;f ' 0:
Going back to equation (17), we see that Q;f = 0 when b = 0; i.e. when bond returns are























Contrary to most of the previous literature, in the empirically relevant case where
Q;f = 0, the optimal equity portfolio S is independent of preference parameters such
as the elasticity of substitution across goods , the degree of risk aversion  or the `trad-
ability' of goods in consumption measured by a. Surprisingly, the complex and non-linear
dependence of equilibrium equity portfolios on preferences parameters disappears once we
introduce trade in bonds.
As a corollary, this implies that the optimal equity portfolio is the same as that of a log-
investor ( = 1). Since we know that log-investors do not care about uctuations in the real
exchange rate, it follows that what determines optimal equity holdings is not the correlation
between equity returns and the real exchange rate. Our result is thus very dierent from
much of the previous literature that emphasized the hedging properties of equity returns for
real exchange rate risk. Instead, equity holdings insulate total wealth (both nancial and
non-nancial) from the ^ " shocks.
To understand the structure of the optimal equity portfolio in equation (20), observe that
the domestic investor is endowed with an implicit equity exposure through the impact of ^ " on
21Engel and Matsumoto (2009) also note that this is the relevant condition in presence of bond holdings,
or forward exchange contracts.
13the return to nonnancial wealth ^ Rn, equal to n (1   )=. Osetting this implicit equity ex-
posure and diversifying optimally requires an equity position S = 0:5
 




The reduced form specication (14) nests many fully specied general equilibrium models
which we now explore.
3.2.1 Redistributive shocks, or nominal shocks with preset prices.
In the model, the distribution of total income between its nancial and non-nancial com-
ponents is controlled by the parameter . Variations in  redistribute income from one to
the other. If we interpret non-nancial income as labor income, shocks to  represent shocks
to the labor share. Such uctuations can occur in a model where capital and labor enter
into the production function with a non-unit elasticity in presence of capital and labor aug-
menting productivity shocks or in presence of biased technical change in the sense of Young
(2004).22
If we interpret "i as shocks to the share that his distributed as dividend, with E0("i) = ,




^ Rf = (1   )^ q + ^ "
^ Rb = (2a   1)^ q
^ Rn = (1   )^ q   
1 ^ "
: (21)
This is a specic case of the general representation in (14) where f = 1; b = 0 and
n =   
1 . Substituting into equation (20) the optimal portfolio satises:23
S











 1(   1): (22)
Since purely redistributive shocks only aect the distribution of total output, but not its
size, the optimal hedge is for the representative domestic household to hold all the domestic
equity. This perfectly osets the impact of the redistributive shocks on total income. Con-
sequently, the equity portfolio exhibits full equity home bias. Equity home bias can arise
here even if returns to nancial wealth and returns to non-nancial wealth are positively
correlated unconditionally.24
The bond position is negative when  < 1   (1   1
)(2a   1) and positive otherwise.
A negative bond position (borrowing in domestic bonds and investing in foreign bonds) is
22See also Ros-Rull and Santaeullia-Llopis (2010).
23Coeurdacier et al. (2009) obtain a similar result.
24Notice that this result does not depend upon the size of the redistributive shock: even a very small
amount of redistributive variation leads to full equity home bias, as long as uctuations in the share of
nonnancial income are of the rst order.
14possible only for suciently low values for . This condition echoes the condition for home
equity bias in the equity only model of section 2.
The model with redistributive shocks has the exact same portfolio implications as the two
period model of Engel and Matsumoto (2009) with preset prices and shocks to the money
supply. In that paper, productivity shocks act as redistributive shocks since rms cannot
adjust their prices but modify their prot margin, redistributing income between labor and
dividends (see section 3.2.3).
3.2.2 Government expenditures or investment expenditures shocks.
Government expenditures represent another potential source of risk. Assume that in each
country i, the government must nance period-1 government expenditures Eg;i equal to
Pg;iGi, where Gi is the aggregate consumption index of the government and Pg;i is the price
index for government consumption, potentially dierent from the price index for private
consumption. Gi is stochastic and symmetrically distributed, with E0(Gi) =  G. Denote
Eg = (Pg;HGH)=(Pg;FGF) the ratio of Home to Foreign government expenditures and ^ Eg
the log deviation of relative government expenditures from their steady-state symmetric
value of one.











where gij denotes country i government's consumption of the good from country j and
ag > 1=2 represents the preference for the home good of the government (mirror-symmetric
preferences) that may dier from the bias in household preferences (ag 6= a).
Denote g the share of government expenditures nanced with taxes on nancial income
TR;i = gEg;i. Budget balance requires that taxes on nonnancial income T w
i = (1 g)Eg;i:25
Market-clearing conditions for both goods are now:
cii + cji + gii + gji = yi: (23)
Following the same steps as before, using intratemporal allocation across goods for govern-
ments and households, relative demand of Home over Foreign goods satises (in log-linearized
terms):26
^ y = sc^ yc + sg^ yg =   ^ q + sg(2ag   1) ^ Eg; (24)
where sc (resp. sg = 1   sc) is the steady-state ratio of consumption spending (resp. gov-
ernment spending) over GDP and   = sc + sg [(1   (2ag   1)2) + (2ag   1)2]. Intuitively,
25We restrict ourselves to cases where the marginal and average shares of taxes on nancial and non-
nancial income in total scal revenues are the same (and equal to g and 1   g respectively). What
matters for equity portfolios is how marginal changes in government expenditures are nanced, not how
they are nanced on average. So g must be understood as the contribution of taxes on nancial income to
nance a marginal increase in government expenditures.
26See appendix (A.4) for details.
15the terms-of-trade ^ q are decreasing with the relative supply of goods ^ y (with an elasticity
1= ) and increasing with relative government expenditure shocks (due to the presence of
government home bias in preferences ag), which act as relative demand shocks.




^ Rf = (1    )^ q + sg






^ Rb = (2a   1) ^ q
^ Rn = (1    )^ q + sg







Direct inspection of (25) reveals that in general markets are locally-complete and that
the system is similar to (14) with:27
^ " = ^ Eg ; f = sg





; b = 0 ; n = sg






The impact of scal shocks on relative equity returns and non-nancial incomes depends
on the uctuations in relative government expenditures ^ Eg; as well as the government pref-
erences for the home good ag, the steady state share of government expenditures in output












 1(    1)
g   
2(1   ag)   (   g)
; (27)
S
 = 1  
(1   ag)
2(1   ag)   (   g)
:
Once again, portfolios are uniquely determined and the equity portfolio is independent
from consumer preferences (,  and a). While optimal equity portfolio are independent
from household preferences, they depend on government preferences through ag and g.
When ag = 1 (government expenditures are fully biased towards local goods), the equity
portfolio is fully biased towards local stocks: S = 1.29 From equation (24), a 1% increase
in Home government expenditures raises Home dividends and Home non-nancial income
before taxes by sg% holdings terms-of-trade (bond returns) constant. With a portfolio fully
biased towards local equity, Home taxes also increase by sg%. Such an equity portfolio
insulates completely consumption expenditures from changes in government expenditures
27The exception is the very peculiar case where 2ag = 1 + g=: In that case, government expenditures
do not modify equity returns conditionally on bond returns, and thus cannot be hedged perfectly. This
rules out the case where government expenditures fall entirely on the domestic good (ag = 1) and the scal
incidence is equally distributed on nancial and non-nancial income (g = ). Note also that the bond
return is unaected because bond returns are not taxed. This ensures that b = 0.
28In this set-up, (15) needs to be slightly modied since private consumption in steady-state does not equal
total consumption. (15) can be rewritten as follows: sc(1   1
)(2a   1)^ q =  (2S   1) ^ Re + (1   ) ^ Rn + 2b ^ Rb
29This is true except for the knife-edge case where equity and bonds have the same pay-os, which occurs
here when g = . In that case, the portfolio is indeterminate. See footnote 27.
16conditionally on bond returns.30
When ag < 1, the optimal equity portfolio depends on the incidence of taxes. When
g = , i.e when increases in government expenditures fall on nancial income proportionally
to its share in gross GDP, the equity portfolio is the one of Baxter and Jermann (1997); in








Conditionally on relative bond returns, shocks to Home government expenditures reduce
Home equity returns and Home labor incomes in the same proportion, making nancial and
non nancial incomes perfectly correlated.
When g = 1, i.e changes in government expenditures are entirely nanced by taxes on







(2ag   1)(1   )
1   (2ag   1)

: (28)
That equity portfolio always exhibits Home bias when ag > 1
2. Holding bond returns
constant, an increase in Home government expenditures decreases dividends net of taxes at
Home and raises Home non-nancial income by raising the relative demand for Home goods
(see (25) for g = 1). Conditional relative equity and nonnancial returns move in opposite
directions and households favors local equities to hedge non-nancial income. The mechanism
is similar to the one in Heathcote and Perri (2007) and Coeurdacier, Kollmann and Martin
(2010). Government expenditures play the same role as (endogenous) investment in these
papers: for a given bond return, increases in Home investment raise Home non-nancial
income due to Home bias in investment spending, but decrease Home dividends, net of the
nancing of investment. This implies a negative conditional covariance between relative
equity and nonnancial income. In fact, the equity portfolios of (28) is identical to the one
described in Heathcote and Perri (2007) and Coeurdacier et al. (2010) if we replace Home
bias in government expenditures by Home bias in investment expenditures.
3.2.3 Other extensions: nominal shocks and quality shocks
The previous results hinge on the important assumption that bond returns provide a good
hedge against uctuations of the real exchange rate. This might not be true in two cases
which we now discuss: rst, when nominal shocks are important and the bonds available
to investors are nominal. Second, in presence of shocks to the quality of goods or when
new varieties are introduced as in Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2007) or Coeurdacier et al.
(2009). In these two cases, while bond returns may be correlated with the real exchange
rate measured by the statistician, the latter may dier from the welfare-based real exchange
rate, the one that matters from the investor's point of view. We explore these two cases in
30Notice that in this case, government expenditures shocks act as redistributive shocks since n=e =
 =(1   ).
17more details in appendix A.5 and summarize the main ndings here.
We show rst that the case with nominal shocks ts the reduced form model of section
3.1.31 With a high degree of price rigidities, nominal bonds track the real exchange rate
and hedging of the real exchange rate is taken care of by the appropriate bond position. As
shown by Engel and Matsumoto (2009), equities are essentially used to hedge uctuations
in the prot share of rms, as in our model with redistributive shocks. With a low degree
of price rigidities, the nominal bond return dierential fails to protect investors against real
exchange rate risk, because of the ination dierentials across countries. Because holding
bonds exposes investors to nominal risk, investors shift their bond position towards zero to
insulate themselves and use equities to hedge real exchange rate exposure. While theoreti-
cally possible, we can safely argue that this example is not very relevant empirically. Indeed,
it would contradict the empirical evidence we provide in section 4 since it would imply that
nominal bond returns do not track well the real exchange rate, the exact opposite of our
empirical ndings.
Consider now the case of preference/quality/variety shocks. In that case, bond returns
dierential do not track the welfare-based real exchange rate (augmented for goods' quality)
unlike equities since equity returns incorporate the adjustment for quality/preference.32 As
before, bonds have poor hedging properties and investors shift bond position towards zero.
All risk-sharing is eectively done by equities. Again, while theoretically appealing, this is
perhaps not so relevant empirically. It would require that the welfare-based real exchange
rate is poorly correlated with the measured one since the latter is strongly correlated with
bond returns.
3.3 The General Case: Bond and Equity Holdings under Incom-
plete Markets
Consider now the case with multiple source of uncertainties. While markets are not locally
complete anymore, one can use Devereux and Sutherland's (2006) approach to characterize
optimal equity and bond positions (see also Tille and van Wincoop (2010)). The key result
is that the expression for equilibrium portfolios as a function of the loadings in equation (19)
still holds when markets are incomplete.
To establish this result, consider a set-up similar to the one of section 3.1 with multiple
sources of risk. The model can be summarized by the following (log-linearized) relationships:
31We introduce money (in the utility function) and price rigidities following Engel and Matsumoto (2009).
Investors trade nominal bonds from both countries. Price rigidities are such that a constant fraction of rms
have preset prices. Uncertainty is driven by shock to the money supply and shocks to the productivity of
monopolistic rms. Hence, markets remain -locally- complete.
32We follow Coeurdacier et al. (2009) by adding preference shocks to the utility provided by Home goods
and Foreign goods to the consumers of both countries. This can be interpreted as a worldwide demand shock




^ Rf = ^ q + ^ y + 0
f^ "
^ Rb = (2a   1)^ q + ^ y + 0
b^ "
^ Rn = ^ q + ^ y + 0
n^ "
;
where ^ " is now a N-dimensional vector of shocks and i for i = fb;f;ng is a conformable
N-dimensional vector that controls the eect of ^ " on returns (bond returns, nancial and
non-nancial returns).
To these equations, we add the intratemporal allocation across goods and the budget
constraint:
^ y =  ^ q + (2a   1)[ ^ PHCH   ^ PFCF   (1   ) ^ Q]
^ PC =  (2S   1) ^ R
f + (1   ) ^ Rn + 2b ^ R
b: (29)
Appendix A.2 shows that the equilibrium portfolio (bond and equity) is unique and well-
dened. As in previous cases, it is informative to project the equilibrium bond and equity
portfolios returns onto of the real exchange rate ^ Q and on return to non-nancial wealth ^ Rn:
 ^ Q  Q;b ^ Rb + Q;f ^ Rf + uQ
^ Rn  n;b ^ Rb + n;f ^ Rf + un
; (30)
where the loading factors i;j are dened as before and ui for i = fQ;ng is a residual,





Dene m as the dierence between the domestic and foreign stochastic discount factor:
m = C
 
H =PH   C
 




^ m ^ R
i
i
= 0 for i = f;b (31)
Substituting (30) into the budget constraint (29) and using the denition of m, we obtain:
^ PHCH   ^ PFCF =  
1





=  (2S   1) ^ R
f + (1   )[n;b ^ R
b + n;f ^ R
f + un] + 2b ^ R
b:





























This is the exact same expression as equation (19). Regardless of the number of risk
factors, the optimal portfolio still uses equities and bonds to hedge the components of real
19exchange rate and non-nancial wealth with which they are correlated.
4 Estimating Optimal Portfolios
We now turn to the empirical evidence. We estimate the importance of bond-hedging for
equilibrium equity holdings of the G-7 countries. We do so by estimating the reduced-form
loading factors Q;i and n;i for i = f;b: Equation (32) shows that this is all we need to
characterize equilibrium portfolios.
4.1 The data.
We collect quarterly data for all G-7 countries over the period 1970:1-2008:3, stopping short
of the global nancial crisis.33 We consider in turn each member of the G-7 as the Home
country, aggregating the remaining countries into a `Foreign country'.
4.1.1 The easy part: bond returns, real exchange rates, nancial and nonnan-
cial income.
We measure gross real bond returns, Rb
i; as the ex-post gross return on 3-month domestic
Treasury-bill converted in constant U.S. dollars.34 The (log) of the real exchange rate Qi
for country i is dened as the dierence between the (log) of the consumer price index in
country i, Pi; and the (log) of the consumer price index for the rest of the world, dened as
a GDP-weighted average of the price indices of the remaining countries:35




where ji represents the share of country j0s output in the rest of the world outside country
i.36 With this denition, an increase in Qi represents a real appreciation of the currency of
country i. Figure 2 reports the real exchange rate for the G-7 countries, normalized to 100
in 2001Q1.
Next, we decompose each country's gross domestic product into a nancial and a non-
nancial component using National Income Account data.37 All variables are converted in US
dollars using nominal exchange rates. The decomposition of output Y by income satises:
Y = COMP + M +  + D + T; (33)
33See appendix B.1 for a detailed description of data sources.
34Short-term government bond yields and dollar nominal exchange rates are obtained from the Global
Financial Database.
35Consumer Price Indices are from the OECD Main Economic Indicators.
36Formally, ji = Yj=
P
j6=i Yj: We use the following weights: Canada (4.14%), France (7.90%), Germany
(10.93%), Italy (7.60%), Japan (16.33%), U.K. (7.74%), U.S. (45.37%).
37Data is obtained from the OECD quarterly national income and from U.N. national account statistics.
20where COMP refers to the compensation of employees, M to mixed income,  to the net
operating surplus, D to the consumption of xed capital, and T to taxes minus subsidies
on production and imports. According to the 1993 United Nations's System of National
Accounts, the net operating surplus  represents the prots of incorporated entities.38 By
contrast, mixed income M denotes income from self-employment as well as proprietary in-
come.39 In the model, nonnancial income denotes the component of aggregate income that
cannot be capitalized into nancial claims. We follow Gollin (2002) and construct an empir-
ical counterpart W as the sum of the compensation of employees COMP; plus a fraction 
of mixed income M:40
W = COMP + M:
Financial income K is then dened as gross operating prots  + D plus the remainder
of mixed income (1   )M, net of non-residential gross capital formation I:41
K =  + D + (1   )M   I:
Using these measures, we construct estimates of the share of nancial income  as K=(Y  
T  I). Table 1 summarizes our estimates for the G-7 countries. These estimates range from
13.1 percent for Germany to 25.4 percent for Italy, with an unweighted average of 16.7
percent. For comparison, the table also reports the `na ve' estimate of  obtained as one
minus the share of compensation of employees in output measured at factor prices, that is
1   COMP=(Y   T). The na ve estimate is much higher, with an average of 41.3 percent.
In what follows, we normalize nancial and nonnancial income by population, and
express them in constant U.S. dollars. Figure 2 reports nonnancial income per capita for
each country relative to the nonnancial income of the remaining G-7 countries. Relative
nonnancial income exhibits marked uctuations over the period. For instance, for the U.S.,
it uctuates between 0.9 and 2.4 times per capita non nancial income in the remaining
countries. It is also strikingly correlated with the real exchange rate, also reported on
the same gure.42 This correlation is one of the reason that the unconditional correlation
between non-nancial returns and equity returns may be very dierent from the correlation
conditional on bond returns.
38It is dened as \the surplus or decit accruing from production before taking account of any interest, rent
or similar charges payable on nancial or tangible non-produced assets borrowed or rented by the enterprise,
or any interest, rent or similar receipts receivable on nancial or tangible non-produced assets owned by the
enterprise."
39It is dened as \the surplus or decit accruing from production by unincorporated enterprises owned by
households; it implicitly contains an element of remuneration for work done by the owner, or other members
of the household, that cannot be separately identied from the return to the owner as entrepreneur but it
excludes the operating surplus coming from owner-occupied dwellings."
40 is assumed equal to COMP=(COMP + ): The results are very robust to alternative measures of ;
including the polar cases where all mixed incomes are treated as nonnancial income ( = 1) and all mixed
incomes are treated as nancial income ( = 0).
41We substract gross capital formation to compute the part of income that ows to owners of nancial
claims on capital. We adjust gross capital formation for residential investment since the latter does not
reect investment decisions of corporations but of households.
42The correlation ranges between 0.68 for Italy and 0.96 for Japan with an average of 0.85
214.1.2 The harder part: returns to nancial and nonnancial wealth
We now construct empirical counterparts to the return on nancial and nonnancial wealth
since neither returns are directly observable.
Consider rst the return to nancial wealth, Rf, where we drop the country subscript i
to ease notation. In general, that return is not equal to the return on aggregate equity Re.
In the model, the two are equal because nancial wealth is entirely capitalized in the equity
market. In practice, rms are nanced through equity and corporate debt, among other
instruments.43 What is needed is an estimate of the return to the rm value. Our benchmark
method looks at the liability side of the rms' balance sheet, using observable equity and
corporate bond market data. Specically, we construct the gross return to nancial wealth,
Rf, as a weighted average of the country's equity (Re) and corporate debt (Rd) gross constant
dollar returns, where the weight  reect the share of corporate debt in the total value of the
rm. These weights are estimated for each country using balance sheet data for non-nancial














As a robustness check, we also construct estimates of Rf under alternative assumptions
in section 4.5.
Consider next the return to nonnancial wealth, Rn. In a dynamic context, that return
diers from the growth rate of real nonnancial income per capita lnW: the latter rep-
resents only the dividend component and not the total return on the corresponding asset.45
To construct estimates of Rn; we follow the present-value method of Campbell and Shiller
(1988), as detailed in Campbell (1996). Under the assumption that the dividend-price ratio












t = k + 
n
t    
n
t+1 + wt+1; (35)








nancial wealth at time t, 
n
t = ln(Wt=V n
t ) is the log dividend-price ratio for nonnancial
wealth,  is a number slightly smaller than 1 and k is an unimportant constant.46
43One might worry that equilibrium equity positions might dier if rms are able to issue debt as well as
equity. We show in appendix A.3 that in the benchmark model where rms' nancing decisions are irrelevant
for the value of the rm, this is not the case. In this Modigliani-Miller limit case, the presence of corporate
debt has no impact on equity portfolio decisions. In models with some departure from Modigliani-Miller,
our results can remain valid as long as changes in the value accrued to debtholders versus shareholders does
not interact with the fundamental shocks of the model.
44See appendix B.1 for details. The average share of debt in total liabilities is 67.1 percent (Canada), 75.2
percent (France), 75.3 percent (Germany), 76.2 percent (Italy), 70.7 percent (Japan), 59.2 percent (U.K.),
71.8 percent (U.S.). The country equity and corporate debt returns are obtained from the Global Financial
Database. For Italy, we set  = 0 since we were unable to obtain a series of yields on Italian corporate debt.
45See Baxter and Jermann (1997, p. 175)
46One can show that  = 1=(1 + exp()) where  is the steady state value of the log dividend-price ratio.
We will use the value of  = 0:98 in line with standard estimates in the literature. Our results are robust to
changes in the value of .
22Using (35) to solve for t forward, imposing the equilibrium condition that limt!1 t (rn
t   wt) =

















This expression makes clear that the innovation to the return on nonnancial wealth on
the left hand side of the equation depends positively upon revisions to the path of future
expected real nonnancial income growth {the cash ow component represented by the rst
summation on the right hand side{ and negatively upon revisions to the path of future
expected real returns {the discount rate component represented by the second summation
on the right hand side.
Our approach consists in constructing the empirical counterpart of equations (36) for
each country using an empirical Vector-Auto-Regression (VAR) in rst dierences of the
following form:47
Zt+1 = A Zt + t+1
where Zt = (~ rt;wt;kt;x0
t)
0. In this expression, ~ rt+s represents a possible proxy for the
return on nonnancial wealth at time t + s; in the sense that Et~ rt+s = Etrn
t+s: This proxy
is necessary to construct the second summation on the right hand side of (36). In practice,
we will set ~ r = rf, that is, we will assume that expected nancial and nonnancial future
returns are equal. Finally, xt denotes a vector of additional controls used to forecast future
factor income growth and future returns.
Our VAR specication rst-dierences nancial and non-nancial income. We discuss
in detail in appendix B.2 why this is the appropriate empirical specication. In short, we
nd that while we cannot reject the null hypothesis that w and k are integrated processes,
we do not nd any statistical evidence of a cointegration relationship between the two.48
Therefore, a stationary VAR in rst-dierences is appropriate.
Based on our reading of the literature on nancial return predictability, we consider a
comprehensive list of potential controls for future asset returns: consumption growth; the
dividend-price ratio; the relative T-bill rate, dened as the dierence between the yield on
3-month T-bill rate and a 4-quarter moving average; the term premium, dened as the
spread between 10 year and 3 months government yields; the yield spread, dened as the
spread between the yield on long-term corporate bonds and the yield on 10-year government
bonds; cay, the uctuations in US aggregate consumption-wealth ratio as measured by Lettau
47Standard Akaike and Schwarz lag-selection criteria indicate that a VAR of order 1 is the preferred
specication for all countries.
48Our approach diers from Baxter and Jermann (1997) who estimate a Vector Error Correction Mech-
anism (VECM) on nancial and nonnancial income, imposing the cointegration relationship that k   w
is stationary. This assumption is appealing on theoretical grounds since the share of nancial income is
bounded between 0 and 1. It is, however, strongly rejected in the data, indicating a very persistent process
for income shares, with no apparent error-correction term. Moreover, as discussed in appendix B.2, the
assumption that k   w is non-stationary is also strongly rejected by the data.
23and Ludvigson (2001); and nxa, the Gourinchas and Rey (2007) measure of US external
imbalances. In order to maintain a parsimonious and statistically signicant representation,
our selection of variables is as follows. First we exclude variables that appear integrated,
based on Augmented-ADF tests, since this would violate our stationary VAR assumptions.
Second, we select predictive variables based on the Least Angle Regression (LARS) approach
of Efron, Hastie, Johnstone and Tibshirani (2004) applied to the nancial return equation
of the Vector Auto Regression. This selection algorithm eciently selects a parsimonious
subset of predictive variables. In our nal specication, only a few predictive variables
remain: consumption growth for Japan and the term premium for the U.S.
With estimates of A and t+1 in hand, the empirical counterpart to rn
t+1  Etrn
t+1 can be









~ rA)(I   A)
 1 t+1; (37)
where e0
y is a row-vector that `selects' variable y in Z; i.e. such that e0
yZ = y for y =
w or ~ r: The rst term, e0
w (I   A)
 1 t+1, captures the contribution of expected future
non nancial income growth (the rst summation in equation (36)). The second term,
 e0
~ rA(I   A)
 1 t+1, captures the contribution of expected future returns on nonnancial
wealth (the second summation in equation (36)). Figure 3 reports the return to nonnancial
wealth rn
t+1  Etrn
t+1 for the U.S., together with the growth rate of nonnancial income w.
The correlation between the two series is high (0.66), but the striking fact is that the return
innovation exhibits much more volatility.49
The last step consists in measuring bond, nancial and non-nancial returns relative to
the rest of the world. To this eect, we dene the relative returns ^ rl























for l 2 fb;n;fg, where ji is the output weight of country j in the rest of the world outside
of country i.
4.2 Estimating the loadings on the real exchange rate
We are now in a position to estimate the key loading parameters in equation (30). We begin
with the loadings on the real exchange rate, Q;j for j = f;b. These unconditional moments
can be estimated for each country by the following simple regression for each country i:








i;t + ui;t: (38)
where ui;t captures the uctuations in the real exchange rate that are not spanned by
relative bond and nancial returns.
49The standard deviation of the return innovations is 3.09% vs. 1.01% for nonnancial income growth.
24Results of regression (38) for each countries are displayed in Table 2. Our empirical results
conrm the results of van Wincoop and Warnock (2010) for all the countries considered in
the sample: relative bond returns capture most of the variations of the real exchange rate.
The coecient on the relative bond returns in panel A, Q;b is often not statistically dierent
from one, between 0.89 for the U.K and 1.02 for Germany. The R2 of the regression is also
very strong, between 0.95 for Italy and 0.981 for the U.S. and France. Moreover, conditional
on bond returns, the variance-covariance ratio for nancial returns and the real exchange
rate, Q;f is almost never statistically dierent from zero.50 Table 2 conrms that, from a
theoretical standpoint, the model with b = 0 provides a very reasonable approximation of
the data.51
Panel B of the table reports the unconditional loading on the real exchange rate 
unc
Q;f
obtained from a regression only on the relative nancial return ^ rf. The coecients are signif-
icantly positive for all countries, between 0.07 (Italy) and 0.69 (U.S.). This re-emphasizes the
importance of properly conditioning on the relative bond returns. Finally, the last column
of the table reports the results from a pooled regression with country xed eects. This can
be interpreted as an average loading for all G-7 countries. The estimates, Q;b = 0:96 and
Q;f = 0:01 conrm the strong correlation between relative bond returns and real exchange
rates.
4.3 Estimating the loading on the return to non-nancial wealth
We now use the returns to non-nancial wealth estimated for each country i to estimate the












i;t + vi;t; (39)
where vi;t is attributed both to the measurement error in the construction of the return on
nonnancial wealth, and to the uctuations in relative nonnancial income risk not spanned
by relative bond returns and relative returns to nancial wealth as in equation (30).
Results of the regression (39) for each countries are shown in Table 3. Panel B reports
the estimate of the unconditional loading factor 
i;unc
n;f = cov(^ rn




i ): This coecient
is positive and signicant for all countries except Italy, with a pooled estimate of 0.26.
This indicates that returns to non nancial wealth are positively correlated with returns to
nancial wealth as in Baxter and Jermann (1997) and the international diversication puzzle
would be `worse than you think' in this earlier literature.
However, the loading factor conditional on bond returns 
i
n;f reported in panel A is
negative for all countries, often statistically so.52 It varies between -0.005 (Germany) and
-0.287 (France) with a pooled estimate of -0.139. As the previous analysis emphasized, this
50The exceptions are the U.K. and Germany. Even for these two countries, Q;f remains economically
very small, less than 6 percent.
51Recall that when b = 0, the theoretical model implies Q;b = 1 and Q;f = 0, which is consistent with
our empirical estimates.
52The loading factor is signicantly negative for all countries but Germany at the 10% signicance level.
25negative conditional loading indicates that in all these countries domestic equities constitute
a good hedge against shocks to non nancial wealth.
Moreover, the positive loadings of (relative) bond returns n;b > 0 implies that shorting
the local currency bond, and going long in the foreign currency bond, constitutes a good
hedge against uctuations in returns to non-nancial wealth (see equation (32)). This is not
surprising: in our model, a (potentially large) part of relative non-nancial income comoves
with the real exchange rate (see gure 2), and we know that relative bond returns track
almost perfectly the real exchange rate.
Going from the reduced form estimates to the structural parameters of the model requires
taking a stand on the `correct' model of the economy. A full-edged structural estimation
lies beyond what we attempt in this paper.53
4.4 Implied equity and bond portfolios
The previous estimates would allow us to back out the implied equity and bond positions
using equations (32) if all countries were symmetric. Allowing for dierent country sizes,
(32) must be rewritten as follows (see appendix (A.6)):
(





Q;b   (1   !i)(1   )n;b




 Q;f   1 
 n;f
 (40)
where !i is the relative size of country i in world GDP.
The implied equity bias and bond portfolios are summarized in table 4 using the load-
ing coecients from our baseline estimates. As equation (40) indicates, the optimal bond
position requires an estimate of the degree of risk aversion . We consider the plausible
value of  = 2 in our benchmark calibration. For the share of nancial income , we use the
average share of nancial income across G7 countries in the more recent period (2000-2008):
 = 0:191.
The model is very successful in predicting a signicant degree of equity home bias for all
countries when bond trading is allowed.
Consider rst panel B, which excludes bonds, as in most of the literature. The baseline
refers to the rst term in equation (40), that is, a predicted portfolio share equal to the share
53As an illustration, consider the reduced-form locally complete model of section 3.1. Equations 17 and
18 determine the mapping from the structural parameters of the model to the ij. It is easy to check
that only three out of the four ij are independent, so the system can be inverted to recover  , b=f
and nf as a function of a, the preference for the home-good. Consider the pooled estimates reported in
tables 2 and 3 and assume a reasonable value of a of 0.75 equal to one minus the share of imports. We
infer the following estimates: b=f =  Qf=Qb =  0:009, n=f = (nf + Qb   1)=Qb =  0:168 and
  = 1   nb(2a   1)=(1   nf) = 0:506. The estimate of   indicates a relatively high elasticity of terms
of trade to relative output, as in Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2008) and Kollmann (2006). Additional
assumptions would be required to map these parameters back into the structural preference parameters such
as the elasticity of substitution between goods , the coecient of risk aversion , or the auxiliary parameters
that control the loadings i.
26in world output !i. The second term (Bias due to Q) reects the contribution of the real
exchange rate hedging component: (1 !i)(1 1=)=
i;unc
Q;f . Given the positive unconditional
correlation between nancial returns and exchange rates (
i;unc
Q;f > 0), this term is positive,
indicating a potential source of home bias. The second term (Bias due to rn) reects the





n;f is strongly positive, this term contributes negatively to the optimal equity portfolio
and dominates the real exchange rate hedge. This results, as in Baxter and Jermann (1997)
is a strong predicted foreign bias, Si   !i ranging from -10 percent for the U.K. to -116
percent for Germany, in total contrast to the data.54
By contrast, Panel A shows that the estimated model accounts for a large share of
observed equity home bias once we introduce bonds. The hedge portfolio is now dominated
by the non-nancial income component. This term is strongly positive since 
i
n;f < 0. The
predicted equity portfolio (S) varies between 5.8% for Germany and 119% for France while
available empirical evidence indicates a home equity position between 55% (Germany) and
85.6% (Canada) (averages over 2000-2008).55 Except for Germany and to a lesser extent
Japan, the equity bias predicted by the model is comparable to the amount of bias in the
data.56
The last line (S) reports the change in the predicted equity position between the equity
only and the full model. In all cases, the predicted equity position increases substantially,
moving the model closer to the data. For instance, in the case of the U.S., the model
with equity only predicts a negligible share in domestic equity (0.83%) while the full model
predicts 101.48% even exceeding the empirical estimate of 83.2%.
Panel A also reports the model predictions for bond holdings. As for equities, we can
decompose the predicted bond position into a real exchange rate hedge component ((1  
!i)(1   1=)Q;b) and a non nancial income component ( (1   !i)(1   )n;b).57 We nd
a strong positive demand for local currency bonds arising from real exchange rate hedging,
given the positive loading factor Q;b, but an even stronger and negative loading factor for
hedging non-nancial income risk, given n;b.58 While each of these component can be large
relative to output, they oset each other and imply net currency exposure of bond portfolios
of reasonable magnitude. Thus, the model predicts that countries should issue bond liabilities
in their own currency, between 22 percent (Japan) and 50 percent (Canada or Italy) of their
domestic output. Data regarding the net currency exposure of debt positions from Lane and
Shambaugh (2010b) suggests that G7 countries are on average short in domestic currency
(and long in foreign currency) although the positions are smaller than those predicted by
54The exception is Italy, where the unconditional loading is negative and therefore the model predicts
more home bias than observed.
55Data are from Coeurdacier and Rey (2011).
56Using Q;f and n;f estimated on pooled data for all countries, we get equity portfolios ranging from
63% for Canada and Germany to 80% for the US, fairly close to the data.
57The baseline is zero for the bond position.
58This term would only grow stronger relative to the real exchange rate hedge if we decrease the coecient
of risk aversion . In the limit where  = 1, the real exchange rate hedge component disappears.
27the model. The average net currency bond exposure is b =  6:3% of GDP over 2000-2004.59
There is some heterogeneity across countries: while US, UK, Japan and Italy are short in
domestic currency, Germany, France and Canada are long. Our empirical counterpart of b
ranges from -16.4% of GDP for the UK to +9.8% for France. As direct inspection of equation
(40) shows, for higher values of  the hedging of real exchange rate becomes progressively
more important, reducing the size of predicted domestic currency bond positions.60
4.5 Using Dierent Measures of Returns to Financial and Non-
Financial Wealth
A key element of our analysis is the construction of returns to nancial and non nancial
wealth rf and rn. If these returns are incorrectly measured, one should be cautious when
interpreting the loading factors and predicted portfolios. This section investigates the ro-
bustness of our results to various alternative measures of nancial and non nancial returns.
A rst point of departure would be to construct returns to nancial wealth using the
same approach as for non nancial returns, with national income data.61 This approach
















Using the same VAR specication as in section (4.1.2), the empirical estimates of the









~ rA)(I   A)
 1 t+1: (42)
The returns on the rm thus obtained may be noisy and imperfectly estimated. Our
second approach instruments the returns in equation (42) with the country's equity and
corporate debt returns, and forcing the weights to sum to one. This is equivalent to choosing
dierent weights ^  in equation (34), measuring the leverage implied by national accounts
data. In other words, for each country, we run a rst stage as follows:
59In the data, countries often have leveraged external debt position. The counterpart of b in the model is
(bHH  bHF)=2 where bHH denotes the net domestic currency debt exposure, that is, the dierence between
domestic currency denominated debt assets and domestic currency denominated debt liabilities{ and bHF
denotes the net foreign currency debt exposure, that is, the dierence between foreign currency debt assets
and foreign currency debt liabilities. This counterpart generates the same wealth transfer towards the a
country whose currency depreciates by 1% with respect to all other currencies than in our model.
60Bond position b becomes eventually positive for high values of . With  = 6:5, the GDP weighted-
average of our predictions for b matches the data, i.e. a GDP weighted currency exposure of -6.3% of
GDP.
61Baxter and Jermann (1997) used such an approach.
62The implementation still requires the use of observed market returns to form expectations of future
returns. That is, in the above expression, ~ r denotes a proxy for future expected nancial and non nancial
returns in the sense that Et~ rt+j = Etr
f
t+j = Etrn
t+j. In practice, we use the returns on the rm constructed
in the previous section as a proxy.
28r
f
t = (1   ^ )r
e
t + ^ r
d
t + t: (43)
The predicted component
 
(1   ^ )re
t + ^ rd
t

of (43) becomes our proxy for returns to
nancial wealth. This method identies the variations in nancial wealth estimated from
national accounts that are reected in market returns and is therefore potentially more robust
to measurement error.
A third approach approach simply sets  = 0; equating the return to nancial wealth






This approach has the merit of simplicity, but as argued earlier, there are good theoretical
reasons why equity returns may dier from the returns to the rm.63
Figure 4 reports the innovations to nancial returns under these alternative measures
for the United States. As can be seen from the gure, the return innovations tend to be
positively correlated.64 The equity return is also the more volatile, with a standard deviation
of 8% per quarter against 3.5% for the projected NIPA return.
Lastly, we also consider a dierent approach to construct returns to non nancial wealth,
borrowing from Lustig and Nieuwerburgh (2008). The basic idea is to recover the unobserved
innovation to non nancial wealth from the joint behavior of consumption and market re-
turns, under the assumption that aggregate consumption satises the rst-order condition of
an optimizing representative household.65 Because consumption growth is not strongly cor-
related with nancial returns, this method infers that returns to non nancial wealth must be
strongly negatively correlated with nancial returns. Indeed, the correlation between returns
to non-nancial wealth constructed in this manner and our benchmark nancial returns is
-0.55 for the United States.
Results of the regressions (38) and (39) are displayed in table 5 and table 6 for the
dierent specications and the dierent countries. Our empirical results conrm the previous
results across all specications: relative bond returns capture most of the variations of the
real exchange rate and claims on nancial income are not used to hedge real exchange rate
changes (see table 5). Moreover, conditional on bond returns, the loadings of non-nancial
wealth on nancial wealth are negative across all specications and signicantly so for most
of the countries, implying home bias in our model (see table 6). This conrms the important
role of bond holdings as an hedging instrument. Hence, qualitatively, results using these
alternative measures of returns are very similar to our benchmark case. Quantitatively, the
amount of equity bias generated by the model is very similar to our benchmark case when
using the projection on market returns of nancial returns estimated from national accounts
(pooled estimate of n;f equal to  0:14), or even larger when using the method of Lustig and
63We also set ~ r = re and re-run the LARS algorithm to select predictive variables. The following variables
are added to the VAR: yield spread (Germany and U.S.), consumption growth and relative T-bill (Japan)
and term spread (U.S.).
64The NIPA returns tend to have the lowest correlation with the other variables, between 0.15 and 0.21.
All other measures are strongly correlated.
65See appendix B.2 for details.
29Nieuwerburgh (2008) (pooled estimate of n;f equal to  0:28). It falls a bit short compared
to the data when using national accounts data or when using equity returns to compute
nancial returns (pooled estimates of n;f equal to  0:07 and  0:09 respectively).66 But
even in these two specications, the model can explain a signicant share of equity home
bias (above 40%). When looking at the US more specically, the equity portfolio implied
by the model are respectively 80% of domestic equity when using national account data and
63% when using equity returns.67
5 Conclusion
What drives equity home bias? This paper merges and improves upon two strands of lit-
erature. The rst strand focused on risks to non-nancial wealth. It concluded that home
equity positions should be even more tilted towards foreign equity since non nancial and
nancial returns appeared positively correlated. The second strand looked at frictions in
goods markets and emphasized real exchange rate risks. In this class of models, ecient
risk sharing requires holding securities delivering high returns when the domestic currency
appreciates. For this class of models to explain the home portfolio bias we see in the data,
domestic equity returns would need to be strongly positively correlated with real exchange
rates. Alas, the data does not oblige and the correlation is too low. What this paper does
is to show that both strands of the literature are related, but incomplete. It starts from
the observation that relative bond returns (nominal or real) are strongly correlated with
real exchange rates. It follows that, in a world where investors can trade both equities and
bonds, they will hedge real exchange rate risk with the latter. And once this is achieved, the
equilibrium equity position will be a function of the residual risks that investors face, namely
the risk to their non-nancial wealth, conditional on bond returns. The paper derives this
prediction in a simple and fairly generic model that encompasses many models of interest.
In this wide class of models, both with complete or incomplete markets, equity home bias
will arise if non nancial risk is negatively correlated with equity returns, after controlling
for bond returns. The paper also characterizes equilibrium portfolios as a simple function
of loading factors that can easily be estimated from data on real exchange rates and returns
on bonds, nancial and non-nancial wealth. We implement this empirical strategy for the
countries of the G-7 and show that under many reasonable specications, the conditional
correlation between nancial and non-nancial returns is such that it can empirically account
for a signicant share of the observed equity home bias. For most countries, the conditional
66One could also argue that these are noisier measure of nancial returns causing attenuation bias on our
estimates of the loadings (
i
n;f in particular).
67Like in our benchmark regression, the unconditional loadings (non-reported) for these two specications
are positive and highly signicant (
i;unc
n;f > 0) implying a very large foreign bias in the model without
bonds. With the Lustig and Nieuwerburgh (2008) approach, the results are more complex. The unconditional
loading becomes large and negative (-0.66 on pooled data) since {by construction- nancial and non nancial
returns are strongly negatively correlated. However, such a large negative unconditional loading would imply
an implausibly high level of home bias (S = 3:76). Nevertheless, the conditional loading remains largely
unchanged and the predicted equity position stays close to the data (S = 0:92).
30correlation between nancial and non nancial returns is negative and economically signif-
icant. In other words, the international diversication puzzle is not so puzzling anymore!
The model also makes reasonable predictions about bond positions and we nd an implied
currency exposure of bond portfolios broadly in line with the empirical evidence.
It is possible to interpret our results in a broader perspective. Nominal exchange rates
present a deep source of puzzles in international nance. They are too volatile and largely
uncorrelated with their fundamental determinants { the exchange rate disconnect puzzle.
To the extent that nominal exchange rate movements drive real exchange rate uctuations,
real exchange rates too, do not behave as predicted in our models {the Mussa (1986) puzzle.
For instance, relative real consumption is not correlated with real exchange rate movements
as models of risk sharing predict {the Backus and Smith (1993) puzzle. In the context of
international portfolios, this implies that real exchange rates uctuations are both uncorre-
lated with relative nancial returns, and that relative nancial and non-nancial returns are
positively correlated, since a given change in the nominal exchange rate aects both returns
in the same direction. Our paper shows that, once currency uctuations are controlled for
through the use of nominal or real bonds, the structure of international equity portfolios
conforms to the predictions of standard portfolio models. This provides a qualied success
for the theory, since an empirically successful theory of exchange rate uctuations remains
elusive.
Two obvious steps are left for future research. First, one would want to go back and
enrich/discriminate among existing models to fully account for the loadings we obtain from
the data. Such a model would be consistent both with observed portfolios (quantities) and
with the covariance structure of exchange rates and asset returns (prices). Second, it would
be interesting to extend the menu of assets beyond stocks and bonds. Models with a larger set
of assets (housing for instance) could also deliver new insights on international risk sharing.
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35Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S. Euro Average
 16.4 14.1 13.1 25.4 16.1 18.5 13.3 17.9 16.7
na ve- 39.9 39.9 40.5 50.9 43.5 36.7 37.8 42.9 41.3
Table 1: Estimates of the share of nancial income in output  (in percent), dened as
the share of nancial income ( + D + (1   )M   I) in output at product prices net of
investment (Y  T  I). The na ve share is estimated as one minus the share of compensation
of employees (COMP) in output at factor prices (Y  T). Source: OECD Quarterly National
Income and U.N. National Account Statistics. Authors' calculations.
Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S. Pooled
Panel A: Conditional Loadings
Q;f -0.019 -0.005 -0.030** 0.007 -0.002 0.059*** 0.011 0.009**
(s.e.) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.006) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.004)
p-val 0.281 0.724 0.048 0.268 0.907 0.000 0.500 0.042
Q;b 1.007*** 0.969*** 1.019*** 0.964*** 1.008*** 0.890*** 0.981*** 0.975***
(s.e.) (0.023) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.023) (0.028) (0.017) (0.007)
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.969 0.981 0.977 0.956 0.972 0.933 0.981 0.968
Panel B: Unconditional Loadings

unc
Q;f 0.579*** 0.579*** 0.594*** 0.070** 0.639*** 0.400*** 0.691*** 0.356***
(s.e.) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.027) (0.042) (0.034) (0.048) (0.016)
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.570 0.565 0.547 0.042 0.605 0.478 0.581 0.327
Obs. 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 1078








Standard errors are in parenthesis. (***) (resp (**)) indicates signicance at the 1% level
(resp. 5%). Unconditional loadings impose Q;b = 0. Last column reports pooled xed eect
estimates. Constants are not reported. Sample: 1970:2 to 2008:3.
36Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S. Pooled
Panel A: Conditional Loadings
n;f -0.171*** -0.287*** -0.005 -0.141*** -0.056 -0.091** -0.235*** -0.139***
(s.e.) (0.064) (0.060) (0.056) (0.020) (0.044) (0.037) (0.078) (0.014)
p-val 0.008 0.000 0.923 0.000 0.211 0.014 0.003 0.000
n;b 1.259*** 1.151*** 1.110*** 1.263*** 0.950*** 0.950*** 1.227*** 1.125***
(s.e) (0.084) (0.075) (0.069) (0.057) (0.055) (0.063) (0.086) (0.022)
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.740 0.705 0.803 0.769 0.826 0.684 0.703 0.742
Panel B: Unconditional Loadings

unc
n;f 0.574*** 0.419*** 0.675*** -0.058 0.552*** 0.272*** 0.619*** 0.263***
(s.e.) (0.064) (0.061) (0.059) (0.040) (0.047) (0.044) (0.077) (0.021)
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.146 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.351 0.237 0.466 0.014 0.480 0.205 0.300 0.128
Obs. 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 1071








i;t + vi;t. Standard errors
are in parenthesis. (***) (resp (**)) indicates signicance at the 1% level (resp. 5%).
Unconditional loadings impose n;b = 0. Last column reports pooled xed eect estimates.
Constants are not reported. Sample: 1970:2 to 2008:3.
37Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S.
Panel A: With Bonds and Equity
Equity
Baseline (GDP weights) 4.14 7.90 10.93 7.60 16.33 7.74 45.37
Bias due to:
Q -4.72 -1.15 -7.11 1.60 -0.47 14.34 1.52
rn 69.54 112.16 2.03 55.21 19.86 35.83 54.60
Total (S) 68.97 118.90 5.84 64.41 35.72 57.91 101.48
Data for (S) (2000-2008) 85.60 71.40 55.40 59.50 84.30 65.20 83.20
Bond
Bias due to:
Q 48.26 44.61 45.38 44.55 42.15 41.03 26.79
rn -97.70 -85.79 -80.06 -94.49 -64.36 -70.93 -54.25
Total (b) -49.44 -41.19 -34.68 -49.94 -22.21 -29.90 -27.46
Data for (b) (2000-2004) 9.30 9.90 8.90 -2.70 -12.70 -16.40 -10.90
Panel B: Equities Only
Baseline (GDP weights) 4.14 7.90 10.93 7.60 16.33 7.74 45.37
Bias due to:
Q 145.47 139.77 138.75 16.91 140.28 96.79 99.08
rn -233.63 -163.87 -255.35 22.73 -196.14 -106.67 -143.61
Total (S) -84.01 -16.20 -105.68 47.23 -39.53 -2.15 0.83
S 152.98 135.10 111.52 17.17 75.25 60.06 100.65
Table 4: Implied Portfolio Equity (S) and bond (b) position for G7 countries. Calculations
are done under the assumption that  = 0:19 and  = 2. (S) refers to the percentage of
domestic stocks held by domestic residents (data for (S) are averaged over the period 2000-
2008). S refers to the dierence between the implied S in a model with bonds and equity
and the implied S with equities only. (b) refers to the net domestic currency exposure of
bond portfolios (as a % of GDP). Data for (b) are computed from Lane and Shambaugh
(2010b) and refers to the average between net debt assets in domestic currency and net debt
liabilities in foreign currency as a % of GDP (averaged over 2000-2004): b =
bHH bHF
2 .
38Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S. Pooled
Financial returns estimated using national accounts
Q;f 0.004 0.008 0.003 0.041*** 0.011 0.017 0.015 0.012**
(s.e.) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.004)
p-val 0.533 0.161 0.727 0.007 0.281 0.226 0.101 0.001
Q;b 0.985*** 0.958*** 0.987*** 0.929*** 0.996*** 0.940*** 0.977*** 0.972***
(s.e.) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) (0.022) (0.017) (0.026) (0.014) (0.006)
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.969 0.981 0.977 0.958 0.972 0.928 0.982 0.968
Projection of nancial returns estimated using national accounts on market returns
Q;f -0.025 -0.011 -0.033** 0.005 -0.008 0.056** 0.012 0.003
(s.e.) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.006) (0.020) (0.022) (0.018) (0.004)
p-val 0.184 0.488 0.022 0.409 0.699 0.013 0.507 0.435
Q;b 1.013*** 0.974*** 1.024*** 0.965*** 1.013*** 0.886*** 0.979*** 0.980***
(s.e.) (0.024) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.024) (0.035) (0.020) (0.007)
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.969 0.981 0.978 0.956 0.972 0.930 0.981 0.967
Financial returns based on equity returns
Q;f -0.007 0.004 -0.005 0.011 -0.003 0.035*** 0.005 0.006**
(s.e.) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.003)
p-val 0.469 0.536 0.506 0.125 0.722 0.002 0.547 0.039
Q;b 0.994*** 0.960*** 0.993*** 0.960*** 1.008*** 0.920*** 0.986*** 0.977***
(s.e.) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016) (0.024) (0.013) (0.006)
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.969 0.981 0.977 0.956 0.972 0.932 0.981 0.968
Nonnancial returns estimated using the method of Lustig and Nieuwerburgh (2008)
Q;f -0.019 -0.005 -0.030 0.007 -0.002 0.059*** 0.011 0.009**
(s.e.) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.006) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.004)
p-val 0.281 0.724 0.048 0.268 0.907 0.000 0.500 0.042
Q;b 1.007*** 0.969*** 1.019*** 0.964*** 1.008*** 0.889*** 0.981*** 0.975***
(s.e.) (0.023) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.023) (0.028) (0.017) (0.007)
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.969 0.981 0.977 0.956 0.972 0.933 0.981 0.968
Obs. 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 1078








i;t + ui;t. Standard errors are in parenthesis. (***) (resp (**))
indicates signicance at the 1% level (resp. 5%). Last column reports pooled xed eect
estimates. Constants are not reported. Sample: 1970:2 to 2008:3.
39Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S. Pooled
Financial returns estimated using national accounts
n;f -0.093*** -0.041 -0.078** 0.007 -0.103*** -0.030 -0.142*** -0.071***
(s.e.) (0.026) (0.028) (0.032) (0.058) (0.022) (0.032) (0.045) (0.013)
p-val 0.000 0.146 0.015 0.907 0.000 0.337 0.002 0.000
n;b 1.178*** 0.904*** 1.188*** 1.179*** 0.989*** 0.876*** 1.153*** 1.063***
(s.e.) (0.058) (0.055) (0.055) (0.085) (0.038) (0.057) (0.068) (0.022)
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.750 0.664 0.810 0.690 0.846 0.673 0.704 0.726
Projection of nancial returns estimated using national accounts on market returns
n;f -0.167** -0.214*** -0.022 -0.141*** -0.068 -0.058 -0.346*** -0.140***
(s.e.) (0.070) (0.069) (0.052) (0.018) (0.049) (0.051) (0.090) (0.014)
p-val 0.019 0.002 0.679 0.000 0.162 0.257 0.000 0.000
n;b 1.252*** 1.079*** 1.128*** 1.262*** 0.962*** 0.919*** 1.339*** 1.130***
(s.e.) (0.088) (0.083) (0.070) (0.055) (0.058) (0.080) (0.097) (0.023)
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.738 0.680 0.803 0.780 0.826 0.674 0.713 0.742
Financial returns based on equity returns
n;f -0.112** -0.053** 0.009 -0.140*** -0.101*** -0.037 -0.073 -0.090***
(s.e.) (0.045) (0.023) (0.066) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.047) (0.015)
p-val 0.014 0.025 0.894 0.000 0.000 0.186 0.124 0.000
n;b 1.185*** 1.067*** 1.309*** 1.283*** 0.500*** 0.917*** 1.035*** 1.014***
(s.e.) (0.081) (0.051) (0.119) (0.064) (0.055) (0.059) (0.068) (0.030)
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.622 0.771 0.490 0.727 0.356 0.657 0.655 0.541
Nonnancial returns estimated using the method of Lustig and Nieuwerburgh (2008)
n;f -0.189*** -0.085** -0.216*** -0.361*** -0.123*** -0.275*** -0.193*** -0.287***
(s.e.) (0.043) (0.042) (0.051) (0.016) (0.043) (0.033) (0.039) (0.012)
p-val 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000
n;b -1.108*** -1.137*** -0.927*** -1.350*** -1.203*** -1.060*** -1.159*** -1.051***
(s.e.) (0.056) (0.052) (0.064) (0.047) (0.054) (0.057) (0.043) (0.018)
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.901 0.899 0.839 0.915 0.916 0.877 0.938 0.885
Obs. 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 1078









i;t + vi;t. Standard errors are in parenthesis. (***) (resp (**)) indicates signicance at
the 1% level (resp. 5%). Last column reports pooled xed eect estimates. Constants are
not reported. Sample: 1970:2 to 2008:3. 40(a) Varying  ( = 2; a = 0:91;  = 1)
(b) Varying  ( = 2; a = 0:91;  = 1)
(c) Varying a ( = 2;  = 2;  = 1)
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Figure 2: Relative nonnancial income (left) [ {] and real exchange rate [-o-] (100 in 2001Q1,
right), G7 countries, 1970:1-2008:3. Data Sources: Global Financial Database, OECD Quar-












Figure 3: Innovations to returns on nonnancial wealth rn
t+1   Etrn
t+1, and nonnancial












Figure 4: Innovations to returns on nancial wealth. Compustat: weighted average of equity
and corporate bond returns using share of debt in total assets measured from Compustat;
NIPA: innovation to nancial return constructed using equation (41); Projected: regresses




A.1 Optimal portfolios with locally complete markets
We apply Devereux and Sutherland (2006) (see also Tille and van Wincoop (2010)) to characterize
the equilibrium portfolio. We show that the zero-order (or static) portfolio is the one that locally
replicates the ecient consumption allocation. The Devereux and Sutherland (2006) approach
nds a portfolio that is consistent with 1) First-order approximation of non-portfolio equations
(here intratemporal allocation across Home and Foreign goods and budget constraints in both
countries) and 2) Second-order approximation of the Euler equations.
There are two non-portfolio equations. The rst is the optimal intratemporal condition for




  + (2a   1)2(   1)

^ q + (2a   1) ^ PC (A.1)
where ^ PC denotes relative consumption expenditures ( ^ PHCH   ^ PFCF ).
The second non-portfolio equation is the budget constraint. The log-linear rst order approxi-
mation is:
^ PHCH   ^ PFCF = (1   ) ^ Rn +  (2S   1) ^ Rf + 2b ^ Rb (A.2)
where ^ Rn denotes the return on nonnancial wealth, ^ Rf denotes excess nancial (equity) returns
and ^ Rb excess bond returns.














where i;0 denotes the Lagrange-multiplier of the budget constraint in period t = 0 in country














The second-order approximation of equation (A.4) yields:
cov( ^ PC; ^ Rj) = (1   1=)cov( ^ Q; ^ Rj); for j = f;b (A.5)
The optimal rst-order portfolio is the pair (S;b) such that the rst order non-portfolio
conditions (A.1) and (A.2) and the second-order portfolio conditions (A.5) are satised for all
realizations of the shocks. It is immediate that a portfolio (S;b) such that ^ PC = (1   1=) ^ Q =
(1 1=)(2a 1)^ q satises the two (second-order) Euler equation approximations. Let us a assume
that it is possible to nd such a portfolio. Then, this is the same thing as saying that relative
consumption expenditures are linked to the real exchange by the expression (9) or equivalently
that markets are (locally) complete.
If such a portfolio exists, it must also satisfy the rst-order non-portfolio equations (A.1) and
(A.2). These can be rewritten (see the equivalent expressions (10) and (12) in the benchmark
45model):
^ y =  ^ q (A.6)
(1   1=)(2a   1)^ q = (1   ) ^ Rn +  (2S   1) ^ Rf + 2b ^ Rb (A.7)
The portfolio choice only aects equation (A.6) because of its impact on equity and bond excess
returns (through its impact on ^ q ); so as long as asset returns are consistent with equation (A.6),
then the rst-order approximation of (A.1) is veried. The key question is wether one can verify
(A.7) in all states of nature. Because we have two instruments (S and b ), we must have at most two
sources of risk. This is the Spanning Condition. Call ^ "1 and ^ "2 the two innovations (expressed
in relative terms) arising from these two sources of risk and assume that our four endogenous
variables f^ q; ^ Rn; ^ Rf; ^ Rbg are driven by ^ "1 and ^ "2 according to the following expression in matrix
form (where we assume that Home bond excess returns load perfectly on the real exchange rate,

























Then, (A.7) is veried for all possible realizations of the shocks if and only if the following
equality holds in matrix form (obtained from projections on the set of shocks (^ "1;^ "2 )):


















 (2S   1)
2b(2a   1)










0 . This is the Rank Condition. This is equivalent to assuming that Home excess equity and
Home bond excess returns are not perfectly correlated. In that case, the equilibrium portfolio
(S;b) is unique and determined as follows:









[(1   1=)(2a   1)]a1;q   (1   )a1;n
[(1   1=)(2a   1)]a2;q   (1   )a2;n

One can rewrite the same proof by changing the basis of shocks as in our examples by using a
projection on ^ q and ^ " = ^ "2 (providing that a1;q 6= 0; i.e. that ^ q and ^ " are not collinear); We















(1    ) n
(1    ) 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and the optimal portfolio satises:
68 We do not need additional assumptions on the stochastic properties except that they are not perfectly
correlated.
46
 (2S   1)























where the rank condition takes the form: (2a   1)f 6= b
 
1    

:
A.2 Optimal portfolios with incomplete markets
As above, we use the Devereux and Sutherland (2006) approach to characterize the optimal equity
and bond positions. To do so, we use the rst-order approximations of the non-portfolio equations
(see reduced-form of the model below) and the second order approximation of the Euler equations.
This pins down a unique equilibrium portfolio.
Non portfolio equations:
 Intratemporal allocation across goods:
^ y =  ^ q + (2a   1)[ ^ PHCH   ^ PFCF   (1   ) ^ Q]
 Budget constraint:
^ PHCH   ^ PFCF = (1   ) ^ Rn +  (2S   1) ^ Rf + 2b ^ Rb




^ Rf = ^ q + ^ y + 0
f^ "
^ Rb = (2a   1)^ q + ^ y + 0
b^ "
^ Rn = ^ q + ^ y + 0
n^ "
;
where ^ " is a N-dimensional vector of shocks and i for i = fb;f;ng is a N  1 vector that controls
the impact of ^ " on assets returns and non-nancial wealth.
Portfolio equations: due to symmetry, we can write Euler equations in relative terms as follows
for asset i = ff;bg:
E0(mRi) = 0 for i = ff;bg (A.8)




Using the budget constraint, the intratemporal condition can be rewritten as follows, where we





^ q = qy^ y + q0























If we rewrite the reduced form model using Devereux and Sutherland (2006) notations, we get











1 + qy q0
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0
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The rst-order approximation of the dierence between stochastic discount factor across coun-
tries gives:





where D1 is a scalar, D1 = 1 + [(1   ) + (2a   1)(1=   1)]q
and D2 = ( (1   )(1 + qy) + (2a   1)(1=   1)qy (1   ) + (2a   1)(1=   1)q0
" + (1   )0
n ) is
a 1  N + 1 vector:
Following DS, we dene ~ R2 = R1 ~ H+R2 and ~ D2 = D1 ~ H + D2
with ~ H = (1 (  (2S   1) 2b )R1) 1 (  (2S   1) 2b )R2









Rearranging terms, this equation simplies into the following expression for portfolios:












where we assume that the 22 matrix [R2D0
2R0
1   D1R2R0
2] is invertible (Rank condition).
When this rank condition is satised, the equilibrium portfolio is unique and bond and equity excess
returns are not collinear. Thus, there exists a unique decomposition such that:
^ Q  Q;b ^ Rb + Q;f ^ Rf + uQ
^ Rn  n;b ^ Rb + n;f ^ Rf + un





A.3 Optimal portfolios with equity and corporate debt
Consider the benchmark model of section (3.1) under locally complete markets. Assume that rms
in country i issue a given amount of corporate debt. We call Di the debt payments that have to
be paid in period t = 1 in country i (we preserve symmetry across countries, i.e E0(Di) = D but
results regarding equity home bias do not depend on this assumption).69
We call SD the share of corporate debt in country i held by country i: Market clearing in the
corporate debt market implies that country j holds a share (1   SD) .
69 We assume that debt issued is bounded above such that period t = 1 equity payments are strictly
positive: (piyi   D) > 0 for all states.
48In this environment, Modigliani-Miller theorem holds. This means that equilibrium rms values
are independent of the amount of debt issued. In particular, the following log-linearized expressions




^ Rf = ^ q+^ y+0
f^ "
^ Rb = (2a   1)^ q+^ y+0
b^ "
^ Rn = ^ q+^ y+0
n^ "
Note that ^ Rf is not relative equity returns anymore (if Di non-zero in some states) but relative
nancial returns, i.e cross country dierence in the sum of the returns on equity and returns on
corporate debt.
We introduce Rn
i the non-nancial returns in country i and R
f
i the nancial returns in country






and corporate debt payments Di ).


















i +(1   S)R
f
j+(SD   S)Di+(S   SD)Dj+b(PH PF) (A.10)
Taking the dierence across countries:
PHCH PFCF= Rn + (2S   1)Rf + (SD   S)(Di   Dj)+2b(PH   PF)
with Rn = Rn
H   Rn










)(2a   1)^ q=  (2S   1) ^ Rf+(1   ) ^ R
n
+(SD   S) ^ D+2b ^ R
b
If we nd a portfolio (S;SD;b) such that the previous equation holds for arbitrary realizations
of the shocks, markets are locally-complete and such a portfolio is the equilibrium one.
The portfolio (S;SD;b) = (S;S;b) obviously satises this condition and is unique, where
(S;b) are the ones derived in (3.1) (see equations (16) and (19)). The intuition for the result is
quite straightforward: the presence of corporate debt only redistributes income from shareholder to
debt holders in some states (without any impact on total nancial returns). By holding corporate
debt and equity in the same proportion, investors insulate their consumption expenditures from
this redistribution.
We can conclude that the presence of corporate leaves the degree of home bias unchanged as
well as the expression in terms of factor loadings once we compute the aggregate nancial returns
^ Rf (equity returns plus corporate debt returns). We also obtain that the (equilibrium) home bias
in corporate debt is equal to the one in equity. This so in this model because returns on nancial
wealth ^ Rf are independent on the capital structure (i.e Modigliani-Miller holds) which makes the
projection on the risk factors (and hence the portfolio) unchanged.
49A.4 Detailed derivation for the model with government expendi-
tures shocks. [Not for publication].
Market-clearing conditions for both goods:
cii + cji + gii + gji = yi: (A.11)
Relative demand of Home over Foreign goods by governments (yg = (gHH + gFH)=(gHF + gFF))
satises (in log-linearized terms):
^ yg =  g^ q + (2ag   1) ^ Eg (A.12)
where 0  g = (1   (2ag   1)2) + (2ag   1)2   represents the impact of uctuations in the
terms of trade on relative government consumption, after controlling for relative expenditures ^ Eg .
Relative demand of Home over Foreign goods by consumers (yc = (cHH + cFH)=(cHF + cFF))
still satises equation (10) since the private allocation across goods has not changed:
^ yc =  ^ q (A.13)
Equation (A.12) and (A.13) together with market clearing conditions of both goods (A.11)
implies the following equilibrium on the goods market:
^ y = sc^ yc + sg^ yg =   ^ q + sg(2ag   1) ^ Eg (A.14)
where sc (resp. sg = 1 sc ) is the steady-state ratio of consumption spending (resp. government
spending) over GDP and   = sc + sgg .
Log-linearizing relative nancial and non-nancial incomes net-of-taxes and bond returns using




^ Rf = ^ qy  
g
 ^ Eg = (1    )^ q + sg(2ag   1  
g
 ) ^ Eg
^ Rb = ^ Q = (2a   1)^ q
^ Rn = ^ qy  
1 g
1  ^ Eg (1    )^ q + sg(2ag   1  
1 g
1  ) ^ Eg
A.5 Other extensions of the benchmark model. [Not for publica-
tion]
We provide two extensions of our benchmark model discussed in section 3.2.3: - nominal shocks
(and nominal bonds) in presence of price rigidities as in Engel and Matsumoto (2009) - shocks to
the quality of goods (or equivalently preferences shocks towards one good or changes in the number
of varieties available to consumers) as in Corsetti et al. (2007) or Coeurdacier et al. (2009).
We do it in the benchmark model of section 3, i.e when markets are locally complete.
Nominal shocks in presence of price rigidities
We follow Engel and Matsumoto (2009) and add nominal shocks and price rigidities to the
benchmark model. We suppose that prices are set one period in advance for a share ! of rms
(where ! is common across countries to preserve symmetry). Firms do not know ex-ante if they
will be able to adjust their price in period 1. All rms post a preset price, and a share (1  !) will
be able to adjust it. Given the symmetry of the model, rms in both countries will post the same
preset the same price in period 0 denoted  p.
50Money enters the utility function and the expected utility at date 0 of a representative agent












where mi denotes money holdings in country i and  is a positive parameter.70
Both countries experience symmetrically distributed nominal shocks to their money supply mi.
Bonds in country i are now nominal bonds that pay one unit of country i's currency. Due to
the ination risk, bonds returns dierentials will be imperfectly correlated with real exchange rate
changes. We introduce the nominal exchange rate s, dened as the number of Foreign currency
units per unit of Home currency. A rise in s represents a nominal appreciation of the Home currency.
All variables are expressed in Home currency terms and we denote ^ s the deviations of the nominal
exchange rate from its mean value of one (E0(s) = 1).
To make our results easily comparable with Engel and Matsumoto (2009), we assume that
in the steady state the share of revenues going to shareholders  is related to the mark-up in
a monopolistic competition Dixit-Stiglitz framework.71. Output in country i is produced using
labor li : yi = aili where ai is a stochastic productivity shock with symmetric distribution across
countries (E0(ai) = 1). This the second source of uncertainty. As in Engel and Matsumoto (2009),
we have `two relative shocks' (^ a and ^ m) and two non-collinear relative assets: markets will be
locally-complete.
Assume that prices are set in the currency of the producer (PCP).72 The price index in country










where pi is the aggregate price over all producing rms in country i in country i's currency. Given
that some rms do adjust and some do not, pi is the CES weighted sum of preset prices  p and
adjusted prices in country i, denoted p
i.
The log-linearization of the Home country's real exchange rate Q  sPH=PF yields:
^ Q = (2a   1)(!^ s + (1   !) ^ q) (A.17)
where q = sp
H=p
F denotes the relative price of rms adjusting their price. Note that when ! = 1,
all prices are preset and the real exchange rate is perfectly correlated with the nominal one. When
! = 0, we are in a ex-price model where the real exchange rate loads perfectly on the terms of
trade equal to spH=pF.
Under PCP, (10) still holds for relative private consumption (^ yC), where one should note that
terms-of-trade are now equal to spH=pF. Using market-clearing conditions, we get that relative
total sales are equal to (1   )(!^ s + (1   !) ^ q).
Due to price rigidities, output is (partly) demand determined and aggregate mark-ups will
change in both countries. Changes in mark-up are formally equivalent to changes in the prot
share  which will potentially lead to some Home bias in equities.
70To simplify matters, we assume that consumption and real money balances are separable in the utility
function and that preferences over real money balances are log. None of our results are aected by these
assumptions.
71In such a set-up, the steady-state prot share  equals to the inverse of the elasticity of substitution
between varieties within a given country
72We adopt Producer-Currency-Pricing but as shown by Engel and Matsumoto (2009) results are very
similar with Local-Currency-Pricing.
51One could solve the model to see how changes in productivity aect the prot share  and
relative exible prices ^ q. This step is however not necessary. To express portfolios, we just need to
rewrite asset returns and labor incomes as a function the Home terms-of-trade ^ q = (!^ s+(1 !) ^ q)




^ Rf = (1   )^ q + ^ 
^ Rb = ^ s = 1
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2! [(1   1=)(2a   1) + (2S   1)(   1)]
(A.19)
When, ! = 1, all rms have preset prices: S = 1 and b = 1
2(2a   1)(1   1
) + 1
2(   1). The
model is isomorphic to the one with redistributive shocks (where ^ " = ^ ); indeed in that case bonds
load perfectly on the real exchange rate.
When ! is close to zero, we get close to a ex-price model with nominal shocks. In this case,
bond positions converge towards zero as investors want to minimize their exposure to nominal risk.
In the extreme case of ! = 0, nominal bonds do not load on the real exchange rate due to
ination risk, but equities do. Then, the model is equivalent to our reduced form model of section
2 with f = w = 0 and b 6= 0. In that case, the portfolio satises:












 (   1)
#
(A.20)
In particular, as might have been expected, the bond return dierential fails to protect investors
against real exchange rate risk because of the ination dierentials across countries. This additional
source of risk on bond returns shifts bond position towards zero. It then remains for equities to
hedge real exchange rate exposure eciently.
The case of changes in quality/preference shocks
We follow Coeurdacier et al. (2009) by adding preference shocks to the utility provided by
Home goods and Foreign goods to the consumers of both countries. In that case, the aggregate








where 	i, i = H;F with E0(	i) = 1 is an exogenous worldwide shocks to the (relative) preference
for the country i good. Note that the shock 	i can also have a more supply oriented interpretation,
as a shock to the quality of good i. We denote 	  	H
	F the relative preference shocks and ^ 	 its
deviation from its steady-state value of one.
73With on slight dierence: nominal bonds now load on the nominal exchange rate and not the real
exchange rate ^ q = !^ s + (1   !) ^ q
52As shown by Coeurdacier et al. (2009), the welfare-based real exchange rate in this case is equal
to (up to the rst-order):








= (2a   1) ^ q (A.22)
where we adjust the terms-of-trade for quality/preference shocks by scaling q as follows: q =
pH= H
pF= F .
As shown by Coeurdacier et al. (2009), under the assumption of (locally) complete markets,
intratemporal allocation across goods imply:
^  y =  ^ q (A.23)
where ^  y are relative endowments adjusted for quality/preference shocks.
Relative equity returns and relative non-nancial incomes still load perfectly on the real ex-
change rate adjusted for the quality/preference shocks (see also Coeurdacier et al. (2009)).
^ Rf = (1   )^ q (A.24)
^ Rn = (1   )^ q (A.25)
We assume that real bonds in each country pays one unit of the good not adjusted for quality:
^ Rb = (2a   1)
^ pH
pF
= (2a   1)(^ q + ^  )
Then, introducing ^ " = (2a   1) ^  , we are back to our reduced form model (with w = f = 0)
and equity and bond portfolios will be the same as in (A.20)). Bond returns dierential fails to load
on the welfare-based real exchange rate because of relative change in quality/preference shocks ^  .
This additional source of risk on bond returns shift bond position towards zero and risk-sharing is
done by equities only.
A.6 Derivation of portfolios for countries of dierent sizes
We extend our benchmark model by allowing dierent country sizes. We assume that expected
production in period t = 1 is not equal across countries: E0(yH) = yH and E0(yF) = yF. We
denote by !i the relative size of country i: !i =
yi
yi+yj, with !H + !F = 1.






( 1)= + (1   ai)1= (cij)
( 1)=
i=( 1)
We assume that is the non-stochastic equilibrium, the following relationship holds:
(1   aH)yH = (1   aF)yF
This ensure that in the trade balance is zero and terms-of-trade q are equal to unity in the
non-stochastic equilibrium.
53Keeping the same notations as in the symmetric case of our benchmark model with locally
complete markets, log-linearization around the non-stochastic equilibrium implies the following
relationships (note that potfolio implications are identical in the case of imperfect sapnning of the
shocks):
^ Q = (aH + aF   1)^ q
^ PC = (1  
1

) ^ Q = (1  
1

)(aH + aF   1)^ q
Log-linearization of the budget constraint in country i gives (using market clearing conditions
in the asset market) for i 6= j:
^ PiCi = (1   ) ^ wi + Sii ^ di +
!j
!i







i denotes the return on the bond of country i (specied below). bii denotes bonds
i held by country i normalized by the mean output yi of country i (in the benchmark model
yi = 1 and bii = bii )
Taking the dierence across countries, we get:

































Rewrite portfolio as follows (assuming symmetry of shocks):
Sii = S = !i+Bf(1   !i)
bii = b = Bb(1   !i)




) ^ Q = (1   ) ^ Rn+S ^ Rf+Bb ^ Rb
Assuming the following loadings on ^ Rn and ^ Q (see main text)
^ Q  Q;b ^ Rb+Q;f ^ Rf
^ Rn  n;b ^ Rb+n;f ^ Rf















Q;b   (1   )n;b
Using S = !i+Bf(1   !i) and b = Bb(1   !i) gives equilibrium portfolios for countries of
dierent sizes: (





Q;b   (1   !i)(1   )n;b









B.1 Data description. [Not for publication]
All data are quarterly, between 1970-Q1 and 2008-Q3.
 Government bond returns: gross return on 3-month domestic Treasury-bill, from Global
Financial Database.
 Nominal exchange rates: from Global Financial Database.
 Consumer Price Index (CPI): from OECD Main Economic Indicators
 Gross Domestic Product: OECD Quarterly National Accounts, Seasonally adjusted, except
as noted. Notes: Germany: data for West Germany before 1991:Q1. Japan: data before
1979 from 1999 OECD Statistical compendium and seasonally adjusted with X-12 method;
Italy: data before 1979 from the 1999 OECD Statistical Compendium (seasonally adjusted).
 Compensation of Employees: OECD Quarterly National Accounts, Seasonally adjusted.except
as noted. Notes: Japan: Japan: data before 1998 from 1999 OECD Statistical compendium
and seasonally adjusted with X-12 method. Italy: data before 1979 from the 1999 OECD Sta-
tistical Compendium (seasonally adjusted). France: data before 1977 from the 1999 OECD
Statistical Compendium (seasonally adjusted). Germany: data for West Germany before
1991:Q1.
 Mixed Income:
{ US: fraction of net operating surplus plus mixed income from OECD Quarterly National
Accounts. Fraction calculated as the share of mixed income in (mixed income + gross
operating surplus - consumption of xed capital) annual data from UN National Income
System of National Accounts. Ratio after 2007 is the average for 2004-2006.
{ UK: fraction of net operating surplus + mixed income. Fraction calculated as the share
of net mixed income in (net mixed income + gross operating surplus - consumption
of xed capital); annual data from UN National Income System of National Accounts
1987-1994. Annual data from 2007 National Accounts Statistics Part III, pp836 for
1995-2005. Ratio after 2005 is the average for 2003-2005. Ratio before 1987 is the
average for 1987-1989.
{ Japan: fraction of net operating surplus + mixed income. Fraction calculated as the
share of net mixed income in (net mixed income + gross operating surplus - consumption
of xed capital); annual data from UN National Income System of National Accounts
1980-2003. Ratio after 2003 is the average for 2001-2003. Ratio before 1980 is the
average for 1980-1982.
{ Italy: fraction of net operating surplus + mixed income. Fraction calculated as the share
of net mixed income in (net mixed income + gross operating surplus - consumption of
xed capital); annual data from UN National Income System of National Accounts
1980-2003. Ratio after 2003 is the average for 2001-2003. Ratio before 1980 is the
average for 1980-1982.
{ Germany: fraction of net operating surplus + mixed income. Uses data from West
Germany before 1991:Q1. Fraction calculated as the share of net mixed income in (net
mixed income + gross operating surplus - consumption of xed capital); annual data
from UN National Income System of National Accounts 1991-2002. Ratio after 2002 is
the average for 2000-2002. Ratio before 1991 is the average for 1991-1993.
56{ France: fraction of net operating surplus + mixed income. Fraction calculated as the
share of net mixed income in (net mixed income + gross operating surplus - consumption
of xed capital); annual data from UN National Income System of National Accounts
1978-2003. Ratio after 2003 is the average for 2001-2003. Ratio before 1978 is the
average for 1978-1980.
{ Canada: fraction of net operating surplus + mixed income. Fraction calculated as the
share of net mixed income in (net mixed income + gross operating surplus - consumption
of xed capital); annual data from UN National Income System of National Accounts
1970-2005. Ratio for 2005-2007 from StatCan. Data after 2007 is the average for 2005-
2007.
 Net Operating Surplus and mixed income: from OECD Quarterly National Accounts, sea-
sonally adjusted, except as noted below.
{ France: before 1978 GDP minus compensation of employees, depreciation and indirect
taxes.
{ Italy: before 1980 GDP minus compensation of employees, depreciation and indirect
taxes.
{ Japan: Before 1998:Q3, net operating surplus + mixed income from OECD Statistical
Compendium quarterly data, seasonally adjusted with X-12 routine. After 1998:Q3,
dened as GDP minus compensation of employees, depreciation and indirect taxes.
{ United Kingdom: before 1988, GDP minus Compensation of employees, Depreciation
and Indirect Taxes.
 Depreciation: OECD Quarterly National Accounts, Consumption of Fixed Capital. Season-
ally adjusted, except as noted below.
{ France: Before 1978, calculated as fraction of GDP, where the fraction is computed
annually as the ratio of consumption of xed capital to GDP from 1999 OECD Annual
National Accounts.
{ Germany: Data for West Germany before 1991:Q1.
{ Italy: Before 1980, calculated as fraction of GDP, where the fraction is computed
annually as the ratio of consumption of xed capital to GDP from 1999 OECD Annual
National Accounts.
{ Japan: Before 1998:Q2 from the 1999 OECD Statistical Compendium. After 1998,
calculated as fraction of GDP, where the fraction is computed annually as the ratio of
consumption of xed capital to GDP from United Nations system of national accounts
annual data.
{ United Kingdom: Before 1988, calculated as fraction of GDP, where the fraction is
computed annually as the ratio of consumption of xed capital to GDP from 1999
OECD Annual National Accounts.
 Indirect Taxes: Taxes less Subsidies on Production and Imports from OECD Quarterly
National Accounts, seasonally adjusted, except as noted below.
{ France: before 1978, from 1999 OECD Statistical Compendium.
{ Germany: before 1991 uses data for West Germany.
{ Italy: before 1980, calculated as fraction of GDP, where the fraction is computed annu-
ally as the ratio of indirect taxes to GDP from 1999 OECD Annual National Accounts.
57{ Japan: before 1998:Q2, from OECD Statistical Compendium quarterly data, seasonally
adjusted with X-12 routine. After 1998:Q2 calculated as fraction of GDP, where the
fraction is computed annually as the ratio of indirect taxes to GDP from United Nations
system of national accounts annual data.
 Gross Fixed Capital Formation: from OECD Quarterly National Accounts, seasonally ad-
justed, except as noted below.
{ France: before 1978, from 1999 OECD Statistical Compendium.
{ Germany: before 1991 uses data for West Germany
{ Italy: before 1980, from 1999 OECD Statistical Compendium.
{ Japan: before 1994 from ESRI National Accounts Oce Total Fixed Investment.
 Residential Investment: OECD Quarterly National Accounts, seasonally adjusted, except as
noted below.
{ Canada: before 1980, assumed to be 25% of total investment.
{ France: before 1978, from 1999 OECD Statistical Compendium.
{ Germany: before 1991 data for West Germany
{ Italy: before 1980, constructed backwards from the growth rate of total construction,
from 1999 OECD Statistical Compendium.
{ Japan: before 1994, from ESRI National Accounts Oce Residential Investment.
{ United States: before 1990, from 1999 OECD Statistical Compendium.
 Consumption: OECD Quarterly National Accounts, seasonally adjusted, except as noted
below.
{ France: before 1978, from 1999 OECD Statistical Compendium.
{ Germany: before 1991 data for West Germany.
{ Italy: before 1980, from 1999 OECD Statistical Compendium.
{ Japan: before 1980, from OECD Statistical Compendium quarterly data, seasonally
adjusted with X-12 routine.
 Equity Returns: Global Financial Database Total Return index.
 Corporate Bond Returns: quarterly holding return on corporate bond assuming a 10 year
maturity. Yields on corporate debt from Global Financial Database.
 Compustat Weights: For each country and each available year, we construct the share of
corporate debt as 1 minus the share of stockholder's equity in total assets for non-nancial
rms listed in Compustat North America (for the US and Canada) and Compustat Global
(for France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK). Data start in 1970 for Canada and the US,
1987 for Japan and the UK, 1988 for Germany and France and 1989 for Italy.
58B.2 Empirical Issues
B.2.1 VAR diagnostic tests
We specify our Vector Auto Regression in rst dierences for lnw and lnk (see section 4.1.2). This
is empirically valid given that:
 w and k are integrated of order 1;
 w and k are not co-integrated.
We verify that these conditions are satised as follows (detailed results available upon request):
 we conduct Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of unit roots for both variables. We cannot reject
the null of a unit root, except for lnw in Japan.
 We perform Johansen tests of co-integration for (w;k). We nd no cointegration relationship,
except for Germany.
 Since theory suggests that the only correct co-integration vector is w   k (see Baxter and
Jermann (1997)), we directly test for stationarity for this variable. Using Augmented Dickey-
Fuller tests, we cannot reject the null of a unit root, except for Germany (with a p-value of
5.3%).
We conclude from these diagnostic tests that a VAR in rst dierence is appropriate. Although
theory suggests that w k should be stationary, this variable is extremely persistent even over long
periods of time, suggesting that the correcting mechanism does not play an important role at least
over the period we consider.
B.2.2 An alternative measure of the returns to non-nancial wealth
Lustig and Nieuwerburgh (2008) propose an alternative approach to measuring the returns to
human wealth. The key identication assumption consists in assuming that consumption choices
are consistent with the choices of a representative agent faced with nancial and non-nancial
wealth. In other words, aggregate consumption satises the Euler equation of the representative
household when using the total return to the agent's wealth. Since this return is a combination of
the return to nancial wealth (observable) and non-nancial wealth (non-observable), one can then
back out the innovation to the return on non-nancial wealth.
The Lustig and Nieuwerburgh (2008) method starts with the two equations below:








Etct+1 = m +  1Etrm
t+1
where the rst equation is a log-linearization of the intertemporal budget constraint following
Campbell (1993), under the assumption that ct   vm
t is stationary, where ct is log-consumption,
vm
t is log-total wealth and rm
t = ln(Rm




 is related to the steady state consumption wealth ratio as  = 1   exp(c   vm): Crucially, V m
t
includes non-nancial wealth. The second equation is the log-linearized form of the Euler equation
that characterizes the slope of the consumption prole.  is the coecient of relative risk aversion
(inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution) and m captures all variance-covariance
terms, assumed constant.
59Substituting the Euler equation into the budget constraint, one obtains an expression for the
innovation to consumption:










The next step consists in writing the (log) return on total wealth as :
rm






t+1 is the return on nancial wealth and rn
t+1 the return on non-nancial wealth and t is
the share of nonnancial wealth in total wealth (possibly time-varying). Following the usual steps,
the innovation to the return on nonnancial wealth satises:
rn
t+1   Etrn
t+1 = (Et+1   Et)
1 X
j=0





The central idea is to recover (Et+1   Et)rn
t+1+j from the consumption innovations in (B.1). Sub-
stituting (B.2) and (B.3) into (B.1), and assuming constant portfolio shares (t = ), we obtain:

























Assuming that nancial returns are observed (as in the benchmark case), we can invert this
expression to obtain an expression for the innovation to nonnancial returns that does not involve
expected future nonnancial returns:74
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t+1   Etrn























t+1+j +  1 (ct+1   Etct+1):
One can estimate the innovation to non-nancial wealth in (B.4) using a Vector Autoregression











t+1 = (1   )e0















74A similar derivation can be obtained in the case where nancial returns are not observed, using equation
(41).
60We implement this VAR estimation in section 4.5 under the assumption that  = 1 and  = 1 .
In that case, the expression for the innovations simplies substantially:
rn
t+1   Etrn
t+1 =  
 
 1   1

e0
rft+1 +  1e0
ct+1:
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